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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court purportedly utilizes the suspect class doctrine in
order to balance institutional concerns with the protection of important
constitutional rights. The Court, however, inconsistently applies this
doctrine, and it has not precisely defined its contours. The political
powerlessness factor is especially undertheorized and contradictorily
applied. Nevertheless, this factor has become salient in recent equal
protection cases brought by gay and lesbian plaintiffs.
A growing body of and federal and state-court precedent addresses the
flaws of the Court’s suspect class doctrine. This Article discusses the
inadequacies of the suspect class doctrine and highlights problems within
the emerging scholarship and precedent that criticizes the Supreme Court’s
errors. This Article offers two alternatives approaches that could inform a
new theory of equal protection for all subordinate classes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During its 2013 term, the Supreme Court issued opinions in two
important sexual orientation discrimination cases. In United States v.
Windsor, the Court considered whether the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying to legally
married same-sex couples federal benefits that attach to marriage.1 In
Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court considered whether Proposition 8, a
California constitutional amendment that prohibits same-sex marriage,
denies equal protection to same-sex couples who wish to marry.2 These
cases gave the Court an opportunity to resolve many lingering questions
regarding the status of sexual orientation as an equal protection category.
The Court, however, declined to announce a new equal protection doctrine
and treaded very carefully to established practice. For instance, in Windsor,
rather than considering whether gays and lesbians constitute a suspect
class, the Court held simply that DOMA violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it is a product of animus directed towards same-sex
couples.3 The Court has invalidated several statutes on the grounds of
animus rather than considering whether the affected classes warrant
heightened or strict scrutiny. In Hollingworth, the Court did not even reach
the merits of the case and instead held that the plaintiffs—private
individuals who supported Proposition 8—lacked standing to defend the
amendment.4
Because the Court issued minimalist rulings in Hollingsworth and
Windsor, the doctrinal status of sexual orientation in equal protection case
law remains unsettled and undertheorized. As this Article will demonstrate,
the Court’s equal protection doctrine suffers generally from many logical
inconsistencies. A survey of that doctrine, however, reveals that when the
Court reviews equal protection claims it seeks to balance democratic
governance against constitutional protection of important personal
interests. In order to weigh these vital concerns, the Court applies shifting
levels of scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of state action. When a
challenged action impairs the enjoyment of a fundamental right or
discriminates against a suspect class, the Court applies strict scrutiny—its
most exacting review. Most other cases, however, trigger rational basis
review—the most deferential judicial scrutiny. The Court has also

1.
2.
3.
4.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.

HUTCHINSON FINAL 975-1034 (DO NOT DELETE)

978

Alabama Law Review

5/4/2014 4:56 PM

[Vol. 65:4:975

developed a middle-tier analysis, intermediate scrutiny, which it applies to
state action that discriminates against quasi-suspect classes.5
With respect to equal protection cases, the tiered analysis is
traditionally known as the suspect class doctrine.6 This doctrine determines
the appropriate level of scrutiny by evaluating a set of factors related to the
political vulnerability of plaintiffs’ social class. Theoretically, the doctrine
treats discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups as
suspicious and presumptively unconstitutional.7
The suspect class doctrine suffers from several weaknesses. It is
extraordinarily undertheorized, inconsistently applied, and it operates
primarily as a gatekeeper that limits the recognition of new suspect classes
rather than extending judicial solicitude to additional vulnerable groups.8
Despite the vagueness and contradictions of the suspect class doctrine,
courts have frequently analyzed four factors to determine what level of
scrutiny to apply in equal protection cases. Specifically, courts have
considered whether: (1) the class has endured a history of discrimination;
(2) the class lacks political power; (3) members of the class share an
obvious and immutable characteristic that renders them susceptible to
discrimination; and (4) the trait that stigmatizes the class bears no
relationship to its members’ ability to contribute to or perform in society.9
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson examined
these factors and concluded that they justify applying strict judicial scrutiny
to state action that discriminates against women.10 Later, however, the
Court settled upon intermediate scrutiny as the standard for analyzing
claims of sex-based discrimination.11
Although each of the Frontiero factors raises questions worthy of
critical exploration, this Article analyzes the political powerlessness prong
5.
See infra text accompanying notes 83–91.
6.
Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the
Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1220 (“The Plyler Court
described equal protection doctrine as organized into two strands of analysis (suspect class and
fundamental right) and three tiers of scrutiny (rational, intermediate, and strict). The equal protection
doctrine thus had settled into this now familiar pattern . . . .”) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–
17 & n.15 (1982); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 9.1, at
530 (Walter Kluwer Law & Business, 1997)).
7.
See infra text accompanying notes 92–98.
8.
See infra text accompanying notes 104–05.
9.
See Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old Problem, New Tactic: Making the Case for
Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based on Family Caregiver Status, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1463, 1481–82 (2008) (“[The heightened scrutiny] factors include (1) the possession of an
immutable characteristic by members of the protected class, (2) the existence of a history of
discrimination against members of the class, (3) the relevance of the characteristic to legitimate decision
making, and (4) the political power of the class.”).
10.
411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (discussing reasons why women constitute a
suspect class).
11.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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exclusively. For several reasons, the political powerlessness factor presents
compelling issues for contemporary legal analysis. First, the political
powerlessness factor is perhaps the most undertheorized element of the
suspect class doctrine. The Court has not devoted much attention to
elaborating a comprehensive definition of political powerlessness. Adding
to the problems with this doctrine, the Court inconsistently applies its
already inadequate definition of political powerlessness. Furthermore, the
Court has described political powerlessness in extremely narrow terms.
Consistent application of the Court’s constricted view of political
powerlessness would make it impossible for most groups, including
existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes, to qualify for judicial
solicitude.12 These shortcomings make the political powerlessness prong a
compelling site for legal inquiry.
Second, while the Court’s doctrine regarding political powerlessness
suffers in numerous respects, this factor has become salient in
contemporary equal protection litigation, particularly cases challenging
discrimination against gays and lesbians.13 In some of these cases, courts
have applied rational basis review after holding that gays and lesbians do
not lack political power.14
Recent rulings by the Second Circuit in Windsor and by the Iowa and
Connecticut supreme courts depart from this trend. These courts have held
12.

As Jane Schacter argues:
In the course of making political powerlessness an element of equal protection doctrine,
the justices have had very little to say about what the idea of political powerlessness means
and requires, and even less to say about the underlying idea of democracy informing the
Court’s assessment of the political process. Supreme Court opinions simply contain very
little by way of exposition.
Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Alter: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate,
109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1376 (2011); see also Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal
Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485,
565 (1998) (identifying “two major problems with the current political powerlessness analysis”—that
“the standards are applied inconsistently across contexts” and “are coarse in the extreme”).
13.
William Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal
Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 7 (2010) (“The gay rights cases of the last generation have
sparked a debate about the role of political powerlessness in equal protection scrutiny.”); Schacter,
supra note 12, at 1366 (“The question whether members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender . . . community are candidates for heightened scrutiny under equal protection principles has
been framed as a central question in many lawsuits on the issue, and the ‘political powerlessness’ idea
has drawn sustained analysis.”)
14.
See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (“In these times
homosexuals are proving that they are not without growing political power. It cannot be said ‘they have
no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.’ A political approach is open to them to seek a
congressional determination about the rejection of homosexuals by the Army.”) (citing Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985)); Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 90-13892,
1992 WL 685364, at *4 (D.C. Super. June 2, 1992) (“Gays and lesbians are, in the 1990’s, a political
force that any elective officeholder may ignore only at his or her peril.”), aff’d, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C.
1995); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614 (Md. 2007) (finding that “gay and lesbian persons are not
powerless but, instead, exercise increasing political power”); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963
(Wash. 2006) (finding the same).

HUTCHINSON FINAL 975-1034 (DO NOT DELETE)

980

Alabama Law Review

5/4/2014 4:56 PM

[Vol. 65:4:975

that political powerlessness is not a prerequisite to the application of
heightened scrutiny.15 Despite discounting the significance of political
powerlessness, the courts still find that gays and lesbians remain vulnerable
to majoritarian mistreatment.16 The Supreme Court upheld the Second
Circuit’s judgment in Windsor, but it decided the case using the animus
principle rather than the suspect class doctrine. Nonetheless, as these
federal and state cases indicate, the relationship of sexual orientation to the
suspect class doctrine has become a central issue in contemporary equal
protection litigation.
In addition to impacting civil rights litigation, the subject of gay and
lesbian political powerlessness has affected legal analysis in the political
branches. In 2011, the Department of Justice decided that it would no
longer defend the constitutionality of DOMA.17 Attorney General Eric
Holder released a memorandum (Holder Memorandum) that explains the
government’s position.18 The Holder Memorandum analyzes Court
precedent and concludes that gays and lesbians qualify for heightened
judicial scrutiny due, in part, to their political powerlessness.19
The importance of the political powerlessness in recent equal
protection litigation has inspired several legal scholars to publish articles
on the subject.20 These articles, along with developments in federal and

15.
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Immutability and lack of
political power are not strictly necessary factors to identify a suspect class.”); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W. 2d 862, 889 (Iowa 2009) (“[W]e consider the last two factors—immutability of the characteristic
and political powerlessness of the group—to supplement the analysis as a means to discern whether a
need for heightened scrutiny exists.”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 427 (Conn.
2008) (“It is evident, moreover, that immutability and minority status or political powerlessness are
subsidiary to the first two primary factors because . . . .”). This Article criticizes the argument that
political powerlessness is irrelevant to a heightened scrutiny analysis. See infra text accompanying
notes 170–94.
16.
See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185 (“In sum, homosexuals are not in a position to adequately
protect themselves from the discriminatory wishes of the majoritarian public.”); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at
461 (“In sum, the relatively modest political influence that gay persons possess is insufficient to rectify
the invidious discrimination to which they have been subjected for so long.”); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at
895 (“We are convinced gay and lesbian people are not so politically powerful as to overcome the
unfair and severe prejudice that history suggests produces discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).
17.
See Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay
Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/24marriage.html?
pagewanted=all.
18.
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, on Litigation Involving the Defense of
Marriage Act to Congress (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
19.
See id.
20.
See Eskridge, supra note 13; Lawrence Friedman, Not the Usual Suspects: Suspect
Classification Determinations and Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 61 (2010);
Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33 (2010); Schacter, supra note 12; David
Schraub, Comment, The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial Protection in the Gay Rights
Movement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1437 (2010); Yoshino, supra note 12; Kenji Yoshino, The Paradox of
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state courts and within the political branches, constitute an important, yet
emergent, conversation regarding the extension of equal protection to gays
and lesbians. Although this evolving discussion has made provocative
insights, the existing scholarship and case law do not resolve many of the
extant problems related to the Court’s analysis of political powerlessness.
In addition, this emerging discourse sometimes rests on problematic or
incomplete legal analysis.
For example, several scholars have criticized the Court’s vague and
narrow conception of political powerlessness. Most of these scholars,
however, have not offered a more complicated alternative.21
Other scholars and some courts have sought to avoid the complications
related to the Court’s elaboration of political powerlessness by treating this
factor as wholly irrelevant to the application of heightened scrutiny.22 This
argument, however, ignores a fundamental justification for the suspect
class doctrine: to correct political process failures.23
Moreover, when scholars discount the significance of political
powerlessness in equal protection doctrine, they forego the opportunity to
examine the multiple factors that make gays and lesbians politically
vulnerable. Analyzing gay and lesbian political vulnerability, however,
could respond to a prevalent stereotype that depicts gays and lesbians as
wealthy, well educated, and politically dominant.24 Opponents of gay and
lesbian equality employ this stereotype to contest the enactment of
protective civil rights measures.25
The prevalent assumption that gays and lesbians possess substantial
economic and political advantages could also inform court rulings that find
that recent political and legal victories by gays and lesbians indicate that
they possess substantial political power.26 This thinking, however, obscures
Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme Court, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 527 ; Kenji Yoshino,
The Gay Tipping Point, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (2010).
21.
See infra text accompanying notes 170–87. Kenji Yoshino’s work is an exception to this
general observation. Yoshino has offered an expanded list of factors that could inform the Court’s
analysis of political powerlessness. See Yoshino, supra note 12, at 563–67.
22.
See Eskridge, supra note 13; see also infra note 249 (citing judicial opinions that discount the
relevance of political powerlessness to the application of heightened scrutiny). See generally infra text
accompanying notes 244–251.
23.
See infra text accompanying notes 49–53.
24.
On the stereotyping of gays and lesbians as wealthy, well educated, and politically dominant,
see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality and the Trial of
Colorado’s Amendment 2, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1057, 1072 (1994); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
“Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1358, 1372–83 (2000); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding
the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 291–94 (1994).
25.
See supra note 24.
26.
See Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *4 (D.C. Super.
June 2, 1992); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963,
975 (Wash. 2006).
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the diversity among gays and lesbians. Gays and lesbians who are poor,
persons of color, disabled, rural dwellers, and members of other
disadvantaged groups, however, do not influence the priorities of social
movement organizations that sponsor much of the legal and political
advocacy that seeks equal rights for gays and lesbians.27 As a result, the
agendas pursued by these organizations have greater appeal and impact
among relatively privileged individuals, such as white men and upper-class
persons.28 Therefore, the attainment of political victories by gay and lesbian
social movement organizations does not necessarily indicate that gays and
lesbians as a class possess political power.29 Instead, it suggests that some
persons within the class possess a meaningful degree of political power. If
true, this fact should not disqualify gays and lesbians from suspect or quasisuspect status. Privilege undoubtedly exists within all of the current suspect
and quasi-suspect classes. Yet, they still receive judicial solicitude.
If courts were to treat political powerlessness as irrelevant to equal
protection, this could impact doctrine outside of the gay and lesbian
context. For example, this change could greatly expand the judicial
invalidation of state action and lead to claims of judicial excess.
Furthermore, discarding political powerlessness in equal protection cases
could validate the troubling application of rigid scrutiny to remedial state
action designed to ameliorate the effects of historical and present-day
discrimination against vulnerable classes, such as persons of color.30 The
emergent discourse regarding political powerlessness and equal protection
does not analyze these potential collateral consequences.
This Article offers alternatives to the Court’s flawed equal protection
doctrine. Part II discusses the development of process theory as a
justification for special judicial protection of politically vulnerable classes.
Part II also analyzes the vague and inconsistent nature of the Court’s equal
27.
Depictions of gays and lesbians in popular culture overwhelmingly centralize whiteness,
youth, maleness, able-bodied status, wealth, and urban settings. See MICHAEL SHELTON, FAMILY
PRIDE: WHAT LGBT FAMILIES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT NAVIGATING HOME, SCHOOL, AND SAFETY IN
THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS (2013) (debunking the myth that gays and lesbians are white, wealthy, and
urban); see also infra text accompanying notes 136–69 (discussing factors that disempower gays and
lesbians).
28.
See Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99
CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1330 n.117 (2011) (discussing a study conducted by Human Rights Commission
that finds that “when LGBT people of color were asked to rank their most important political priorities,
many of the ‘gay’ issues privileged by the mainstream gay rights movement, such as same-sex
marriage, ranked below guaranteeing racial equality and HIV prevention/treatment, among other raceand class-inflected issues”); see also Hutchinson, supra note 24, at 1368–72 (discussing how race,
class, and gender impact desirability of LGBT rights initiatives).
29.
Furthermore, due to varying levels of wealth and power, gays and lesbians might not share the
same goals related to social change. If this is the case, then it is difficult to argue that political victories
achieved by gay and lesbian social movement organizations represent victories for or the political
power of the entire class.
30.
See infra text accompanying notes 307–69.
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protection doctrine, particularly as it pertains to the protection of classes
that suffer from political powerlessness. Part III analyzes case law in which
plaintiffs have argued that gays and lesbians constitute a suspect or quasisuspect class. Part III demonstrates that several courts have rejected this
contention after finding that gays and lesbians are politically powerful. Part
IV analyzes recent legal scholarship and judicial opinions that elaborate
new theories regarding political powerlessness and the suspect class
doctrine. After discussing the shortcomings of these alternative approaches,
Part IV advances two possible alternative theories of equal protection that
could replace the heavily criticized doctrine the Court currently utilizes.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION, SUSPECT CLASSES, AND GAYS AND LESBIANS
A. Process Theory and Its Origin
Although several theoretical approaches could inform the judicial
elaboration on equal protection, Court doctrine remains amorphous and
confusing. Most commentators agree that, at a minimum, equal protection
prohibits certain forms of discrimination or disparate treatment by state
actors. Beyond this point, reasonable minds diverge with respect to a
coherent approach.31
One of the most formidable barriers to cohering equal protection is the
need to isolate the kinds of discrimination the Constitution prohibits. The
historical context of the Reconstruction Amendments demonstrates that the
Framers intended to bar certain forms of state action that discriminate on
the basis of race. The historical record, however, does not support the idea,
favored by many contemporary conservatives, that the Framers intended to
ban every form of race-conscious state action.32 The Framers’ openness to
certain types of racial discrimination has generated substantial debate
among scholars and jurists concerning the appropriateness of race-

31.
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 616 n.2
(“describing ‘text and history’ of the Equal Protection Clause as ‘vague and ambiguous’” (quoting Paul
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976))); Cass
R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process
and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1988) (“The scope of the [Equal Protection]
Clause and the precise content of the equality norm are of course deeply disputed.”).
32.
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 413–14 (2011) (arguing that
“colorblindness is foreign to both the text and the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); see also Stephen Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious
Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477 (1998) (making similar observation with respect
to the power of Congress).
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conscious state action and neutral state action that disproportionately harms
persons of color.33
After the demise of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court determined that
the Equal Protection Clause only guaranteed civil and political equality, but
not social equality. As the Court infamously held in Plessy v. Ferguson:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature
of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either.34
The Court reasoned that racial segregation was not a product of white
supremacy. To the extent that blacks believed racial segregation had racist
roots, the Court concluded that they were unnecessarily “choosing” to view
these policies negatively.35
In Brown v. Board of Education, however, the Court held that “separate
but equal” public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.36 The Court
explicitly rejected the argument in Plessy that dismissed the tangible and
intangible injuries that blacks suffered due to mandatory racial
segregation.37
Brown received support from a majority of the American public,
national political actors, and national and global press.38 After an initial
period of calm, however, Brown eventually radicalized southern states.
Successful southern politicians became much more conservative and
defiant on questions of racial justice. Local authorities enacted many
facially neutral measures blatantly designed to subvert the implementation
of Brown. Also, some whites engaged in acts of racial terrorism and

33.
David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 940–
42 (1989) (discussing various possible theories of equal protection including that it prohibits
“impartiality” and “subordination”).
34.
163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
35.
Id. at 551 (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.”).
36.
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
37.
Id. at 494–95 (“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”) (internal citation omitted).
38.
MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
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violence in order to defend Jim Crow against the protests of a nation that
was becoming more racially tolerant.39
Within the legal academy, some scholars praised the holding in Brown,
even as they asserted that the ruling lacked an adequate theoretical
foundation. Herbert Wechsler, one of the most noted critics of Brown,
argued that the Court failed to base its desegregation rulings upon neutral
principles.40 Also, Alexander Bickel challenged the Court’s holding that the
intent of the Framers regarding state-mandated racial segregation in public
schools was inconclusive. According to Bickel, it was clear that the
Framers did not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment would invalidate
social inequality. Bickel therefore chastises the Court for not explaining its
decision to ignore this uncomplicated history.41 Given their prestigious
backgrounds, the critics of Brown commanded the attention of their peers.
The academic critiques of Brown generated scholarly responses that
defended the decision. Charles Black, for example, contested the reasoning
of both Wechsler and Bickel. Black argued that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits states from “significantly disadvantag[ing]” blacks and
that “segregation is a massive intentional disadvantaging of the Negro
race.”42
Louis Pollack comprehensively addressed Wechsler’s argument that
the Court’s desegregation decisions lack a theoretical basis. Pollack argued
that the division of political, civil, and social equality is inconsistent with
the Equal Protection Clause.43 The separate-but-equal doctrine announced
in Plessy, however, rests firmly upon this now-outdated distinction.44
Additionally, Pollack, like Black, argued that official racial segregation
harms blacks and that southern states enacted such measures in order to
perpetuate racial hierarchy.45 Finally, Pollack asserted that the SlaughterHouse Cases justifies the Court’s treatment of racial discrimination against
39.
Id. at 385–420.
40.
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
41.
Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 65 (1955). But see Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93 (explaining why the Framers’ intent is
insufficient to determine the constitutionality of racial discrimination in contemporary public
education).
42.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 421
(1960).
43.
Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1959) (“Nothing in the equal protection clause suggests a dichotomy between
laws affecting civil and political rights and those affecting social relationships. That clause proscribes
all laws which impose special disabilities on particular persons or groups without any reasoned basis for
the differential treatment.”).
44.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 537, 544 (1896).
45.
Pollak, supra note 43, at 31 (“The three post-Civil War Amendments were fashioned to one
major end—an end to which we are only now making substantial strides—the full emancipation of the
Negro . . . .”).
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nonwhites as constitutionally suspicious.46 By design or effect, Jim Crow
perpetuated the oppression that blacks endured as slaves. Because racial
segregation was rooted in white supremacy and because it denied blacks
equality in a host of social and political settings, it was inconsistent with
the text of the Equal Protection Clause and with the Court’s earliest
interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments.47
Over two decades after these initial debates regarding Brown, John
Hart Ely would provide substantial academic justification for the ruling
and, more broadly, for the Court’s invasive scrutiny of state action that
discriminates on the basis of race and, potentially, other factors. In
Democracy and Distrust, Ely responds to Bickel’s concern that Brown and
other Warren-era cases were countermajoritarian because they overturned
laws implemented by democratic branches of government.48
Today, many legal and political science scholars have rebutted general
claims that judicial review is countermajoritarian, relying upon qualitative
and quantitative research which finds that Court rulings typically correlate
with known public opinion. This research also challenges the assumption
that the political branches are majoritarian, drawing from scholarship that
discusses the structural dimensions of Congress and the Executive that
diminish majoritarian influence.49 Ely, however, accepts the empirical
claims of countermajoritarian criticism.50 He then turns to constitutional
text and Court precedent in order to validate judicial
countermajoritarianism. Ely draws heavily from footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products.51 Ely argues that courts should rigorously
evaluate state action that represents a failure of the political process.
According to Ely, a process failure exists when laws place substantial
restraints upon the exercise of First Amendment activities and voting,
which are essential to political representation.52 Ely also argues that a

46.
Id. (“[A]nd on the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one can
fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each,
and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly–made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him.” (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71–72 (1873))).
47.
See generally Black, supra note 42; Pollak, supra note 43. See also Sumi Cho, Redeeming
Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40
B.C. L. REV. 73, 124 (1998) (“Pre-Brown, white supremacy manifested itself in the system of
segregation supported by an ideology of biological determinism.”).
48.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
49.
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and
Supreme Court Politics 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 12–32 (2005) (citing numerous sources).
50.
ELY, supra note 48, at 101–04.
51.
United States v. Carolene Prods., Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938); see also ELY, supra
note 48, at 73–100 (discussing countermajoritarianism).
52.
Id. at 103.
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political process tainted by prejudice against “political outsiders”
constitutes a process failure, thus warranting a more stringent judicial
analysis.53
B. The Supreme Court and Process Theory
Ely’s research has greatly influenced legal scholarship and, to some
extent, the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine. The Court applies a
tiered analysis to equal protection claims. In cases involving discrimination
on the basis of a quasi-suspect or suspect class, the Court applies
intermediate or strict scrutiny, respectively. For all other equal protection
claims, the Court applies rational basis review—the most deferential
standard of review.54 The Supreme Court has relied upon several tests to
determine whether certain classes deserve heightened or strict scrutiny.
Some of these formulations either implicitly or explicitly draw from Ely’s
representation-reinforcement approach. At times, however, the Court has
clearly not relied upon process theory.
The most detailed discussion of representation-reinforcement among
the Justices appears in Frontiero v. Richardson.55 In Frontiero, the Court
invalidated a federal law that provided an automatic dependency benefit to
wives, but not to husbands, of military servicemembers. To qualify for the
benefit, husbands had to prove dependency upon their wives’ income.56
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion would have applied strict scrutiny to
sex discrimination, but Burger, Powell, and Blackmun concurred only in
the judgment.57 Nevertheless, Brennan’s justification for applying strict
scrutiny to sex discrimination has influenced legal scholarship and doctrine
related to equal protection.
Brennan listed several factors that make discrimination against women
suspicious. Brennan observed that women have suffered a long history of
discrimination.58 He also emphasized that sex discrimination is perhaps
most pronounced in the political branches of government.59 The acutely
53.
Id. at 43–72.
54.
Anthony Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 387, 398 n.12 (1994) (“It is fairly well settled that under the ‘suspect classification’ branch of
Equal Protection analysis there are three standards of review that may be applied: strict scrutiny
(applicable to discrimination on the basis of ‘suspect’ classifications), intermediate scrutiny (applicable
to discrimination on the basis of ‘quasi-suspect’ classifications), and rational basis review (applicable to
all other cases).”) (internal citation omitted).
55.
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
56.
Id. at 691.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 684.
59.
Id. at 686 n.17 (“It is true, of course, that when viewed in the abstract, women do not
constitute a small and powerless minority. Nevertheless, in part because of past discrimination, women
are vastly underrepresented in this Nation’s decisionmaking councils.”).
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low number of women holding positions of power in federal and state
governments demonstrated women’s political disempowerment.60
Furthermore, Brennan argued that sex typically bears no relationship to a
person’s “ability to perform or contribute to society.”61 Finally, he observed
that sex, “like race,” is an immutable characteristic beyond the control of
the individual.62 Discrimination on the basis of this fixed biological trait
violated firmly established fairness principles contained in Court
precedent.63
Twelve years after Frontiero, Brennan reiterated these four factors in
Rowland v. Mad River Local School District.64 Rowland involved a
challenge to a decision by an Ohio school district to discharge a teacher
“solely because she was bisexual and had told her secretary and some
fellow teachers that she was bisexual.”65 Although the Court denied the
teacher’s petition for certiorari, Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented. Brennan argued that the Court should have granted the petition
because it raised unresolved questions of “individual constitutional
rights.”66
Brennan argued that the school district potentially violated the Equal
Protection Clause, and he framed the equal protection issue as a question of
process theory.67 Drawing from footnote four of Carolene Products, he
maintained that “homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority
of this country’s population.”68 He also observed that because of
“immediate and severe opprobrium . . . [homosexuals] are particularly
powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena.”69 Finally,
60.
Id.
61.
Id. at 686.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. Today, scholars tend to reject biologicalization of identity categories, like race and sex.
Instead, these categories are socially constructed. Susan Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
307, 381 (2005) (“We do not choose our identity categories; socially constructed meanings about race,
gender, class, and other salient characteristics precede us in our social milieus and are operationalized at
every moment by those we encounter in ways that we are often unable to renounce.”). The term gender
is used to identify the socially constructed aspects of sex. Janet Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The
Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 273 n.47 (1993) (“[U]sage of
the term ‘gender’ to refer to the socially constructed aspects of sexual difference, while reserving the
term ‘sex’ for the biologically determined attributes of sexual difference, is consistent with
contemporary usage in the social sciences.”). Feminists, however, caution that many so-called sexrelated differences actually rest on social construction as well. See, e.g., Katherine Franke, The Central
Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2
(1995) (arguing that “under close examination, almost every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex
discrimination can be shown to be grounded in normative gender rules and roles.”).
64.
470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Mem).
65.
Id. at 1010.
66.
Id. at 1011.
67.
Id. at 1014.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
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Brennan asserted that “homosexuals” have been the victims “of pernicious
and sustained hostility” and that due to this history, discrimination against
them likely rests on “deep-seated prejudice rather than . . . rationality.”70
Process theory also influenced the Court’s analysis in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.71 In Rodriguez, the Court upheld
a Texas policy that used local property taxes, along with state and federal
subsidies, to finance public school districts. The plaintiffs argued that the
policy discriminated against pupils in poor districts.72
The Court, however, held that students in poor districts do not
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. The Court reasoned that “the
class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.”73 Thus, the use of judicial review to protect
plaintiffs from the political process was unwarranted.
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court invalidated a Texas law that denied a free
public education to undocumented children.74 Although the Court found
that undocumented persons do not constitute a suspect class, it,
nevertheless, applied intermediate scrutiny due to the special vulnerability
of undocumented children.75 The Court held that denying these children an
education would severely stigmatize them, deprive them of self-esteem and
the ability to engage in participatory democracy, and render them a
permanent underclass.76 The Court also found that while undocumented
adults enter the country voluntarily, their children do not.77 Thus, Texas
punished the children for having a status they could not control.78
In Plyler, the Court relied upon Rodriguez to explain when a group
qualifies for more rigorous equal protection scrutiny. The reason comes
from process theory, namely, that the class suffers from political
vulnerability and thus requires “extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.”79

70.
Id.
71.
411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
72.
Id. at 4–5.
73.
Id. at 28.
74.
457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); see also supra note 6.
75.
Id. at 219 n.19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’”); id. at 219–20
(distinguishing undocumented children from adults).
76.
Id. at 221–24.
77.
Id. at 220.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 216 n.14 (“Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups, have historically
been ‘relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process.’” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 28 (1973))).
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The Court utilized a similar approach in Graham v. Richardson when it
held that “aliens” constitute a suspect class.80 Although the Court discusses
the scrutiny question somewhat summarily, it turns to footnote four of
Carolene Products to justify the application of strict scrutiny. The Court
simply held that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and
insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate.”81 The Court’s reliance upon Carolene Products indicates that
it viewed prejudice against aliens as “a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”82 In other words, the
Court utilized process theory.
In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court
invalidated a municipal law that required a proposed group home for the
“mentally retarded” to secure a “special use” permit before it could open.83
Other group living facilities, like fraternities and convalescent centers, did
not have to obtain the special use permit, which has more rigorous
procedural hurdles than the typical land-use permit.84 The Fifth Circuit held
that the mentally disabled constitute a quasi-suspect class and, applying
intermediate scrutiny, invalidated the requirement.85 The Supreme Court
upheld the judgment but reversed the finding that the mentally disabled
constitute a quasi-suspect class.86
In order to reach its decision, the Court explicitly considered the
political powerlessness of the class of mentally disabled individuals. After
finding that Congress had passed numerous remedial statutes related to
mentally disabled persons, the Court held that the class could not qualify
for heightened scrutiny.87 The Court reasoned that the enactment of the
remedial measures by Congress “negates any claim that the mentally
retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to
attract the attention of the lawmakers.”88
Although the Court found that mental disability is an immutable
characteristic, the Court nonetheless finds that it is a relevant trait, which

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)).
See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4.
473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 437–38.
Id. at 442, 450.
Id. at 443–45.
Id. at 445.
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diminishes the significance of its immutability.89 The Court cites to a
passage in Democracy and Distrust that makes a similar argument:
“Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something
he or she can’t do anything about, but I’m not aware of any reason
to suppose that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that
feeling. Moreover, classifications based on physical disability and
intelligence are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges
and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The
explanation, when one is given, is that those characteristics (unlike
the one the commentator is trying to render suspect) are often
relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there’s not much left
of the immutability theory, is there?”90
The Court’s discussion of political powerlessness and Democracy and
Distrust demonstrates the relevance of process theory to equal protection
doctrine.91
C. Departure from Process Theory
In numerous rulings the Court has conceived of judicial review in equal
protection cases as a means of policing the political process. State action
that mistreats historically vulnerable groups often reflects blunt prejudice,
which in turn evinces a malfunctioning political process.92 Despite the
Court’s consideration of political process theory in some cases, many
important exceptions exist.
1.

Race and Sex

First, the Court did not explicitly turn to process theory when it began
applying strict scrutiny in racial and sexual discrimination cases. In the
context of race, for example, the Court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits all racial distinctions and that strict scrutiny ensures
that state actors limit their consideration of race to the pursuit of
compelling objectives.93 Because current Court doctrine views racial
discrimination as universally suspicious, it has applied strict scrutiny

89.
Id. at 442.
90.
Id. at 442 n.10 (quoting ELY, supra note 48, at 150 (emphasis omitted)).
91.
See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 48.
92.
Ely tries to hide behind the veil of “process,” but he is really making a substantive claim. See
supra note 48.
93.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218–23 (1995).
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symmetrically in racial discrimination cases.94 Despite the fact that whites
have not endured a history of racial discrimination and political
vulnerability due to their racial status, the Court nevertheless applies strict
scrutiny to whites’ claims of discrimination.95 The Court’s doctrine has
shifted from one that protects suspect classes to a mechanism to root out
suspect classifications.
Moreover, while men have not generally faced subjugation and
political marginalization on account of sex, the Court applies intermediate
scrutiny in all sexual discrimination cases.96 In fact, the first case of sex
discrimination to receive intermediate scrutiny involved male plaintiffs.97
The symmetrical application of strict and intermediate scrutiny in equal
protection cases is inconsistent with the theory that judicial review protects
politically powerless classes from majoritarian mistreatment.98
2. Other Categories
The Court has also failed to consider political powerlessness in other
cases involving vulnerable groups. For example, the Court has applied a
sometimes amorphous version of intermediate scrutiny in cases involving
discrimination against non-marital children.99 The Court has justified this
approach due to the history of discrimination related to this status—not
political powerlessness.100
3. Politically Powerless, but No Judicial Solicitude
The Court has also declined to apply heightened scrutiny to cases that
involve classes with strong claims of political isolation and historical
mistreatment. For example, the Court has rejected arguments that poor
people, the elderly, mentally disabled, and undocumented persons qualify
as suspect or quasi-suspect classes.101 Also, narrowly adhering to Court
doctrine, numerous lower federal courts have held that gays and lesbians do

94.
See Hutchinson, supra note 31, at 638–40.
95.
See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 465 (1997) (discussing application
of strict scrutiny to whites’ claims of racial discrimination).
96.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
97.
Id.
98.
Hutchinson, supra note 31, at 638–54.
99.
See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1983) (discussing precedent regarding non-marital
children).
100.
Id. Non-marital children, however, probably lack political power due to their age.
101.
See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (poor); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976) (elderly); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mentally
disabled); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class.102 Furthermore, while the
Court has never considered whether gays and lesbians constitute a suspect
class, in his dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans, Justice Scalia made it
absolutely clear that he would disagree with such a finding due to his own
belief that gays and lesbians possess disproportionate wealth, education,
and political power.103
4. Gatekeeping
The Court has not recognized a new suspect class or classification
since 1976, when it started applying intermediate scrutiny in sex
discrimination cases.104 Because the Court has usually invoked political
process theory to deny judicial solicitude, some scholars have argued that
the suspect class doctrine operates merely as a gatekeeping mechanism,
rather than as an honest effort to protect politically powerless classes.105
The gatekeeping assessment of the suspect class doctrine has substantial
merit. For several reasons, however, this argument, even if true, does not
make a discussion of political process theory irrelevant.
First, the Court has never explicitly overruled the suspect class
doctrine. It is still good law.106 Because this precedent remains valid, it
could potentially shape future cases brought before the Court. This is
especially true of sexual orientation discrimination cases because the Court
has never considered whether gays and lesbians constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class. While the Supreme Court has not applied political
process theory in sexual orientation discrimination cases, this issue has
generated substantial analysis in state and lower federal court opinions.107
Furthermore, in 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder analyzed the
suspect class doctrine in a memorandum that explains the government’s
refusal to defend DOMA.108 The Holder Memorandum concludes that gays
and lesbians constitute a quasi-suspect class and that DOMA would not
survive judicial application of intermediate scrutiny.109
Moreover, constitutional law scholars have renewed their concern with
political process theory after many theorists had written off the suspect

102.
See infra text accompanying notes 137, 146, 148, 151, and 153.
103.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645–46 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
104.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
105.
See Yoshino, supra note 12, at 558 (arguing that the Court uses the suspect class doctrine in
order to “limit[] the number of groups deemed to deserve the courts’ solicitude”).
106.
Lower courts continue to apply the doctrine even though the Supreme Court has generally
declined to do so. See infra text accompanying notes 138, 152, and 212.
107.
See infra text accompanying notes 137, 146, 148, 151, and 153.
108.
See supra note 18.
109.
See supra note 18.
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class doctrine as a relic from a bygone era.110 Today, a growing number of
legal scholars believe the Court should construct a normative theory of
equal protection that does not rest on the proposition—real or imagined—
that the Court protects vulnerable groups from majoritarian influences.111
Process theory, however, is not necessarily irrelevant to the formulation of
that normative theory. Political vulnerability could serve as just one factor,
among many others, that informs a new theory of equal protection that
treats certain categories of discrimination as invalid, not because they result
from a malfunctioning political process, but instead because the types of
injuries they cause are inconsistent with equal protection itself.112
The next Part of this Article analyzes the use of political process theory
in sexual orientation discrimination claims. Because the political
powerlessness factor has the most explicit connection to a finding of
political vulnerability and because it has become somewhat controversial in
sexual orientation discrimination cases, this factor will receive substantial
engagement in the next Part. Finally, the next Part considers the strengths
and weaknesses of alternatives to political process theory advanced in
recent legal scholarship and judicial opinions concerning sexual orientation
and the Equal Protection Clause.
III. GAY AND LESBIAN POWER
A. “Gay Power” as a Civil Rights Slogan
Gay men and lesbians began to organize and build their own
institutions after World War II.113 Although the organizations they formed
focused largely on social activities, gays and lesbians also engaged in
political and legal work as well. Activism among LGBT individuals
changed rapidly during the next decade. Inspired by the successes of the
Civil Rights Movement, the Women’s Movement, and the Stonewall
Rebellion, LGBT rights activists became radicalized.114 They criticized
heteronormativity and gender normativity and urged other LGBT persons
to express their identities publicly.115 Some activists employed methods
advanced by the Black Power movement.116 Also, during this liberationist
110.
See sources cited supra note 27.
111.
See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 12, at 1376.
112.
See infra text accompanying notes 129 and 143.
113.
Patricia Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551,
1581 (1993).
114.
Id. at 1580–81.
115.
Id. at 1581.
116.
Kevin Mumford, The Trouble with Gay Rights: Race and the Politics of Sexual Orientation
in Philadelphia, 1969–1982, 98 J. AM. HIST. 49, 54 (2011) (discussing the influence of “Black Power”
movement on gay male organizers).
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era, some black nationalists and gay liberationists tried to form coalitions,
but these efforts were unsustainable due to homophobia and racism among
the two groups.117
More radical gay and lesbian rights groups, however, emulated black
nationalists who encouraged blacks to become self-sufficient and who
believed that blacks and whites were innately distinct.118 “Black Power”
became a leading expression of the nationalists. Similarly, Gay
Liberationists embraced “Gay Power” as emancipatory rhetoric.119
Historically, an embryonic gay liberation movement used the phrase
“Gay Power” in order to contest inequality when civil rights protections for
gay and lesbian people were virtually nonexistent and when discrimination
and stigmatization were rampant. Today, however, the belief that gays and
lesbians possess political power has justified denying them the very civil
rights protection that they have endeavored so long to achieve.
B. Gay and Lesbian Power and the Denial of Equal Protection
1. Political Powerlessness and the Suspect Class Doctrine
In equal protection cases, federal and state courts consider whether a
group is politically powerless in order to determine whether it constitutes a
suspect or quasi-suspect class. The Supreme Court’s elaboration of political
powerlessness suffers from many weaknesses. In particular, the Court has
defined political powerlessness in extremely narrow terms.120 In Cleburne,
the Court held that mentally disabled individuals do not qualify for
heightened scrutiny, in part, because they did not demonstrate that they had
“no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.”121 The existence of
federal statutes that benefit the class proves it possesses some political
power.122 If the Court utilized this same standard consistently, it would
disqualify all of the existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes as candidates
for judicial solicitude.123 Many state, federal, and municipal policies
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, alienage, and
sex. These categories, however, all receive strict or intermediate scrutiny.
The Court has never sufficiently addressed this glaring inconsistency.124

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 12.
See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
Id. at 443.
See supra text accompanying note 20.
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 8.
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Furthermore, in some cases, the Court has shifted from discussing
suspect classes to analyzing suspect classifications. Thus, while Latinos
constitute a suspect class, warranting strict scrutiny for any discriminatory
state action they experience, the Court applies strict scrutiny to any racial
classification—including those that burden whites. Whites, however, do
not face hostility and disadvantage in the political process on account of
race.125
The class-to-classification shift means that groups that are historically
advantaged receive strict or intermediate scrutiny for their discrimination
claims once the Court concludes that it should depart from rational basis in
equal protection cases brought by historically marginalized groups. Today,
the Court accepts the argument Justice Powell made in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke: “equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color.”126 Powell’s observation, however, is inconsistent
with many cases in which the Court has considered the group’s political
powerlessness (and history of discrimination) in order to determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.127 Powell, however, validated this
blatant inconsistency when he opined that political powerlessness and other
factors should determine what new groups constitute a suspect class, but
race should always receive scrutiny.128 In other words, Powell concedes
that his arguments mean that some future litigants would still have to prove
their political vulnerability to receive judicial solicitude, but whites would
not face this requirement.129
Although the Court has justified this contradiction by contending that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all racial distinctions, this justification
is problematic. First, legal historians have demonstrated that the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment could not have believed that all racial
distinctions were inconsistent with equal protection because they enacted
legislation that provided race-based remedies for the former slaves and that
maintained segregation in District of Columbia public schools.130
Furthermore, aside from finding that all racial classifications require
strict scrutiny, which is a strained conclusion, the Court has never
announced a general rule that would determine when a classification, rather
than a class, qualifies as suspect or quasi-suspect. Instead, it has relied

125.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
126.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978).
127.
See supra notes 12, 15, 79 and accompanying text.
128.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.
129.
See Hutchinson, supra note 31, at 648.
130.
See generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (discussing support for race-conscious legislation
among Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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primarily upon the class-to-classification shift or the inherent
unconstitutionality of racial classifications to justify the application of
heightened and strict scrutiny to certain classifications.
Moreover, the Court has justified the denial of heightened scrutiny to
vulnerable classes on the grounds that symmetrical scrutiny would make it
more difficult for governmental actors to remedy discrimination they face.
In Cleburne, the Court observed that if it applied intermediate scrutiny to
laws that discriminated on the basis of mental disability, then it would have
to apply the same level of scrutiny to laws that benefited the class—and
thus discriminate against people without mental disabilities.131 The
application of intermediate scrutiny to remedial policies for the mentally
disabled would make those laws more susceptible of judicial
invalidation.132 This risk, however, only exists because the Court applies
heightened scrutiny symmetrically. That the Court applies intermediate
scrutiny to equal protection claims brought by mentally disabled persons
should not compel identical treatment of claims challenging policies that
favor them. Nevertheless, had the Court found that the Cleburne plaintiffs
were members of a quasi-suspect class, persons without mental disabilities
would automatically receive heightened scrutiny of their equal protection
claims despite their inability to meet the political powerlessness and history
of discrimination factors. The Court’s symmetrical equal protection
doctrine ignores the difference between invidious and remedial policies.133
Although the Court contends that the class-to-classification shift treats
everyone evenly, it actually fails to do so.134 Politically dominant classes
undoubtedly would fail to secure judicial solicitude if the Court required
them to satisfy the elements of the suspect class doctrine.135 These classes,
however, would immediately accomplish this same goal if the Court found
that a politically vulnerable class who shares a trait with the dominant class
(e.g., the wealthy and poor have an economic status) constitutes a suspect
or quasi-suspect class.136 The class-to-classification shift does not function
as a coherent and uniform approach to equal protection.

131.
See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985).
132.
See id.
133.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(arguing that the Court’s affirmative action doctrine would “disregard the difference between a ‘No
Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat”).
134.
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (stating that equal
protection must mean the same thing for all races).
135.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 95, at 451.
136.
Hutchinson, supra note 31, at 646–47.
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2. Gays and Lesbians and Political Powerlessness
The Court’s narrow and inconsistent analysis of political powerlessness
has made it difficult for gays and lesbians to convince courts that they
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Although the Supreme Court has
never considered whether gays and lesbians qualify for heightened or strict
scrutiny, several state and lower federal courts have confronted this
question. Until recently, most of these courts followed the Court’s narrow
construction of political powerlessness and denied suspect class status to
gay and lesbian plaintiffs. In many of these cases, the courts’ rulings turn
on very little evidence—some of which actually suggests that gays and
lesbians lack political power.
In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, for example, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
military’s exclusion of gays and lesbians.137 Applying the suspect class
doctrine, the court found that the political power of gays and lesbians
precluded a finding that they constitute a quasi-suspect class.138 To reach
this conclusion, however, the court relied exclusively on two news articles:
Homosexuals are not without political power. Time magazine
reports that one congressman is an avowed homosexual, and that
there is a charge that five other top officials are known to be
homosexual. Support for homosexuals is, of course, not limited to
other homosexuals. The Chicago Tribune . . . reported that the
Mayor of Chicago participated in a gay rights parade . . . .139
The court’s evidence of political power is dubious at best. Applying
Cleburne, the court sought only to consider whether gays and lesbians were
“without political power.”140 Complete deprivation of political power,
however, is a difficult, if not impossible, standard to meet, and it certainly
is not the only way to prove that a group suffers abuse in the political
process.
Furthermore, the court’s own evidence of gay and lesbian power
suggests that the group suffers from political powerlessness. The court
could only point to one openly gay member of Congress.141 This would
constitute underrepresentation even by conservative standards.
Also, the court’s statement that some governmental officials are
“charged” with being “homosexuals”142 suggests that gay and lesbian status

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 465–66. The court considered other factors, such as history of discrimination.
Id. at 466 n.9 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 466 n.9.
Id.
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is criminal or otherwise sinister. The use of such language by the court
confirms the general marginalization of gays and lesbians. Furthermore,
that these alleged homosexuals have concealed their sexual orientation
helps to prove the political vulnerability of gays and lesbians.143 An
abundance of psychological data shows that the closet is not necessarily a
healthy place, but that gays and lesbians are driven to hide their identities
in order to escape harassment, discrimination, violence, and other forms of
mistreatment.144 If gay and lesbian status were not politically
disempowering, then these closeted officials might have chosen to disclose
their sexuality.
Furthermore, that the Mayor of Chicago marched in a gay rights parade
does not mean discrimination against gays and lesbians does not exist—
particularly within the military. Instead, it could simply indicate that in the
liberal urban community of Chicago, marching in the parade was not
politically risky. This reality, however, does not change the fact that gays
and lesbians suffer discrimination nationwide. Finally, regardless of the
power that gays and lesbians might have exercised in Chicago in 1989, the
statutory prohibition of gays and lesbians from the United States military
remained in effect until 2011.145
A similarly narrow analysis of political power appears in Dean v.
District of Columbia.146 In Dean, two gay men argued that a District of
Columbia law that prohibited same-sex marriage infringed numerous
statutory and constitutional rights, including the equality component of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.147
Ultimately, the District of Columbia Superior Court summarily agreed
with several federal courts of appeals cases that upheld governmental
discrimination against gays and lesbians.148 The court, however,
specifically addressed the issue of political powerlessness and found that
gays and lesbians were too powerful to qualify for judicial solicitude:
Of perhaps equal significance to this Court in reaching a similar
finding of no “suspect class” or quasi-suspect class” [sic] is the
reality that homosexuals today are not so lacking in political power
as to warrant enhanced constitutional protection. Witness, for
143.
Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 931 (1989); see also Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724–28 (1985).
144.
Robinson, supra note 28, at 1369–78.
145.
Elisabeth Bumiller, Out and Proud to Serve, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/after-toiling-in-shadows-to-end-dont-ask-dont-tell-1st-lt-joshseefried-greets-a-new-era.html?pagewanted=all.
146.
Dean v. Dist. Of Colombia., 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
147.
Id.
148.
Id. at 309.
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instance, the recent passage by the City Council and signing by the
Mayor of the Domestic Partnership Bill. Gays and lesbians are, in
the 1990’s, a political force that any elective officeholder may
ignore only at his or her peril.149
The court finds that the mere passage of a municipal domestic partnership
bill makes gays and lesbians of formidable interest group that has the
power to punish discriminatory lawmakers. The court reaches this
conclusion despite the legislative denial of marital rights to gays and
lesbians. Although the court finds that gays and lesbians have a dominate
voice in local politics, they were unable to secure the passage of marriage
equality legislation in the District of Columbia until 2009, more than
seventeen years after the trial court’s decision in Dean.150
In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, the
Ninth Circuit upheld a discriminatory policy that subjected gay and lesbian
applicants for certain federal jobs to more invasive background and
security checks.151 The Court applied the suspect class doctrine and,
borrowing from Cleburne, found that gays and lesbians do not meet the
standards for quasi-suspect status:
[L]egislatures have addressed and continue to address the
discrimination suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual
orientation through the passage of anti-discrimination legislation.
Thus, homosexuals are not without political power; they have the
ability to and do “attract the attention of the lawmakers,” as
evidenced by such legislation.152
State courts have also decided equal protection claims brought by gay
and lesbian litigants. Although these cases raise questions of state
constitutional law, state courts often follow Supreme Court precedent
regarding federal constitutional law in order to interpret the meaning of
analogous state constitutional provisions. Some of these state courts have
also employed narrow conceptions of political power in order to deny
judicial solicitude to gays and lesbians.
Opinions by the supreme courts of Maryland and Washington
demonstrate how constrained conceptions of political power operate to

149.
Id. at 350.
150.
Ian Urbina, D.C. Council Approves Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/us/16marriage.html.
151.
895 F.2d 563, 578 (1990).
152.
Id. at 574 (citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985)).

HUTCHINSON FINAL 975-1034 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

“Not Without Political Power”

5/4/2014 4:56 PM

1001

deny heightened scrutiny to gay and lesbian litigants.153 Both of these
courts held that state prohibitions of same-sex marriage do not violate state
constitutional law.154 Both courts followed Cleburne and, after discussing
numerous state policies that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, found that gays and lesbians do not require judicial
solicitude.155
In addition, the Colorado trial court that presided over Romer v. Evans
concluded that gays and lesbians do not constitute a suspect class because
they possess sufficient power to protect themselves in the political
process.156 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that voters in
the state enacted a constitutional amendment that repealed and banned the
future implementation of state policies that protect gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals from discrimination.157 In one way, this court requires even less
to demonstrate political power than the Cleburne decision. In Cleburne, the
Court determined that mentally disabled individuals did not constitute a
quasi-suspect class because legislatures had enacted laws that benefited
them in several contexts.158 By contrast, the Colorado trial court held that a
statewide political loss demonstrated gay and lesbian political power.159
The court reasoned that because 46% of voters opposed the amendment,
gays and lesbians failed to present evidence that they were politically
vulnerable.160
The court also concluded that President Bill Clinton’s support of
various gay and lesbian initiatives and the passage of the then-repealed
Colorado antidiscrimination laws provided additional evidence of gay and
lesbian power.161 The court, however, does not discuss Clinton’s retreat
from his campaign promise to lift the military policy of excluding gays and
lesbians due to widespread and virulent opposition among members of
Congress and military leadership.162 Also, Clinton supported and signed
153.
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 624 (Md. 2007) (holding that state equal protection
provision does not require state to recognize same-sex marriage); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d
963, 986 (Wash. 2006) (same).
154.
See Deane, 932 A.2d at 635; Andersen, 138 P.3d at 990.
155.
Deane, 932 A.2d at 613 (“[R]ecent legislative and judicial trends toward reversing various
forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation underscore an increasing political coming of age.”);
Anderson, 138 P.3d at 974–75 (“The enactment of provisions providing increased protections to gay
and lesbian individuals in Washington shows that as a class gay and lesbian persons are not powerless
but, instead, exercise increasing political power.”).
156.
Evans v. Romer, 1993 WL 518586, at *12 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), aff’d, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
157.
Evans, 1993 WL 518586, at *1.
158.
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985).
159.
Evans, 1993 WL 518586, at *12.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
John Cushman, The Transition: Gay Rights; Top Military Officers Object to Lifting
Homosexual Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/14/us/the-transition-
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DOMA into law.163 Finally, although gay and lesbian activists successfully
lobbied for the passage of civil rights policies in a few Colorado cities,
state voters were so angered by the existence of these laws that they
mobilized to repeal them and to make it impossible to enact similar laws
without a constitutional amendment.164 Thus, any gay and lesbian political
power that might have led to the creation of these laws was fleeting and
tenuous.
Although the Supreme Court has never considered whether gays and
lesbians constitute a suspect class, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer
broached the issue. Scalia would have applied rational basis review and
found Amendment 2 constitutional.165 While the majority never discusses
the suspect class doctrine, Scalia considers elements of this doctrine in his
dissent.166 Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
describes gays and lesbians as disproportionately wealthy and politically
powerful:
[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside
in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high
disposable income, and, of course, care about homosexual-rights
issues much more ardently than the public at large, they possess
political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and
statewide. Quite understandably, they devote this political power to
achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social
acceptance, of homosexuality.167
Scalia’s reasoning makes it abundantly clear that he would deny heightened
scrutiny to gays and lesbians. Scalia’s argument rests on the false
assumption that gays and lesbians are wealthy and powerful. Numerous
empirical studies, however, debunk this perception.168
gay-rights-top-military-officers-object-to-lifting-homosexual-ban.html. (“This is a judgment that will
have to be made by political leaders . . . . The military leaders in the armed forces of the United
States—the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior commanders—continue to believe strongly that the
presence of homosexuals within the armed forces would be prejudicial to good order and discipline.
And we continue to hold that view.” (quoting Colin Powell)); Maria Puente, Nunn Ready to Do Battle
to Keep Gays Out of Military, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 1993, at 5A (describing objection to gays and
lesbians in the military among members of Congress); Editorial, A Retreat on Gay Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/19/opinion/a-retreat-on-gay-soldiers.html (arguing
that Clinton retreated from plan to allow gays and lesbians to serve in military due to “prejudice and
politics”).
163.
See Melissa Healy, Clinton Signals He’d Sign Anti-Gay Marriage Bill, L.A. TIMES, May 23,
1996; Clinton Draws Criticism from Gay Activists, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1996.
164.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996).
165.
Id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166.
Id. at 645–46.
167.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
168.
See infra text accompanying notes 294–304.
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Scalia’s argument resembles the logic of the Colorado trial court.
Because gays and lesbians are politically powerful, Amendment 2 does not
represent an irrational majoritarian disadvantaging of a political minority.
Instead, the law is merely “a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the
laws.”169
C. General Problems with the Court’s Analysis of Political Powerlessness
1. Undertheorized
A review of the Court’s equal protection case law reveals numerous
weaknesses in the elaboration of political powerlessness. First, the standard
is ambiguously defined. In Rodriguez, for example, the Court considered
whether people who live in poor neighborhoods were “saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”170
Although this language indicates that the Court considers judicial review as
a representation-reinforcement mechanism, this standard lacks a clear
meaning.
2. Narrow
Court doctrine also employs an extremely narrow definition of political
power. In Cleburne, for example, the Court found that scattered legislative
prohibitions of discrimination against the mentally disabled prove that the
class has sufficient power to “attract the attention of the lawmakers.”171
This standard is exceedingly narrow for two reasons. First, the existence of
beneficial legislation is just one measure, among many others, of a group’s
political power. Political scientists have discussed the many factors that
contribute to political power. These factors include: the group’s wealth;172

169.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 636.
170.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
171.
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
172.
Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Money and Institutional Power, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1673, 1676 & n.11 (1999) (“[T]heorists of political power treat personal resources, especially
wealth, as potential power. Studies of community power in the 1920s and 1950s found that the
wealthiest people in a city seemed to have the greatest political influence or reputation for influence.”)
(citing FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE 81 (1953); ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN
MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN 413–34 (1929); ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND,
MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, 74–101 (1937)).
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the extent to which public opinion supports the objectives of the group;173
whether the group can eliminate disadvantaging practices with relative ease
or whether political gains would require a sluggish and very expensive
process;174 whether the group can influence mass media, which in turn
helps to shape public opinion and political decisions;175 whether the
group’s primary reform issues are so outside what dominant groups would
accept that it never even advances or advocates these concerns;176 whether
pernicious stereotypes or prejudice deter others from supporting the group
and its needs;177 and whether any favorable legislation for the group passed,
not due to its own power, but because political elites wanted to satisfy their
own interests.178
Kenji Yoshino, influenced by Cass Sunstein, has also proposed a list of
factors that include: “(1) the group’s income and wealth; (2) its health and
longevity; (3) its freedom from public and private violence; (4) its ability to
exercise its political rights; (5) its education level; (6) its social position;
and (7) the acceptability of prejudice against the group.”179 Because the
Court has narrowly construed the meaning of political power, its doctrine
has denied heightened or strict scrutiny to several vulnerable classes,
including the poor and the mentally disabled.180

173.
Kevin Arceneaux, Paul Brace, Martin Johnson & Kellie Sims-Butler, Public Opinion in the
American States: New Perspectives Using National Survey Data, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 173 (2002)
(discussing the influence of public opinion and ideology upon policy outcomes).
174.
John Garrard, Social History, Political History and Political Science: The Study of Power, J.
OF SOC. HIST. 105, 108 (1983) (“[W]e also need to take into account the ‘distance travelled’ by the
person or group subject to any exercise of power, and the costs involved in compliance.”).
175.
Kevin M. Carragee & Wim Roefs, The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research, J. OF
COMM. 214 (2004) (discussing media processes and political outcomes); Robert M. Entman, Framing
Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power, J. OF COMM. 163 (2007) (same).
176.
JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN AN
APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980) (discussing political science concept of “quiescence”); see also Helen
Ingram & Anne Schneider, Social Construction of the Target Populations: Implications for Politics and
Policy, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 334, 341 (1993) (arguing the “advantaged groups” utilize the political
process because it typically benefits them); id. at 342 (arguing that disadvantaged groups fear the
political process because they have learned “that it is not in the public’s interest to solve their
problems”).
177.
Ingram & Schneider, supra note 176, at 334–37 (discussing the impact of social construction
upon social groups).
178.
Garrard, supra note 174, at 108 (discussing possibility that disadvantaged classes could only
achieve victories “from a willing political elite” or if the elite acquiesced to their demands in order to
gain bargaining power for future disputes).
179.
Yoshino, supra note 12, at 565 (citing Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 2410, 2430 (1994)).
180.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980)
(“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”) (citing
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (“But this Court has
never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.”
(quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973))).
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Second, the Cleburne standard is too narrow because it requires a
complete deprivation of political power in order for a group to constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class.181 This standard would disqualify many
groups—including current suspect classes—from receiving judicial
solicitude.182 The Court’s reasoning implies that previously disempowered
groups that achieve some legislative success have reached a “tipping point”
with respect to political power and no longer deserve judicial solicitude.183
This conclusion, however, does not place the attainment of these legislative
benefits within a historical context. The formal movement for gay and
lesbian rights in the United States began in the 1950s.184 The first case
asserting a right to same-sex marriage was decided against the plaintiffs in
1971.185 It was not until 2003, however, that Massachusetts became the first
state to recognize same-sex marriage.186 Under prevailing Supreme Court
precedent, if after decades of litigating, lobbying, enduring mistreatment,
and conducting public educational campaigns, a despised class finally
secures some legislative victories, this class suddenly loses its politically
powerless status. This standard, however, obscures the historical timeline
in which these victories occurred. Court doctrine focuses only on the
increasingly egalitarian present-day situation, rather than considering the
“distance travelled” by the group in order to achieve basic civil rights.187

181.
Levy, supra note 20, at 42 (“It is hard to see how complete political powerlessness could be
a requirement in light of Frontiero and Craig v. Boren, insofar as women make up at least half of the
voting population. Yet in Cleburne, the Court pointed to the existence of some political power (for
example, the lack of complete political powerlessness) as one reason to reject heightened scrutiny for
classifications based on developmental disabilities.”) (internal footnote omitted).
182.
Id. (noting contradiction between Cleburne and sex discrimination cases); City of Cleburne,
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 467 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Moreover, even when judicial action has catalyzed legislative change, that change certainly does not
eviscerate the underlying constitutional principle. The Court, for example, has never suggested that
race-based classifications became any less suspect once extensive legislation had been enacted on the
subject.”).
183.
Kenji Yoshino, The Gay Tipping Point, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (2010) (“The gay tipping
point raises the question of whether gay individuals are still a politically powerless minority deserving
of judicial protection in this country.”).
184.
See Cain, supra note 113, at 1580.
185.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2176 (2002) (citing Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971)) (discussing the first same-sex marriage litigation), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
186.
Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). In 1993, the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the state’s prohibition of same-sex marriage required a strict scrutiny analysis.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). On remand, the trial court held that the prohibition
violated the state constitution. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Ct. App.
Dec. 3, 1996). Voters, however, passed a constitutional amendment allowing the legislature to define
marriage in opposite-sex terms, which abrogated the court ruling. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The
Legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
187.
See Garrard, supra note 174, at 108.
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3. Inconsistent Application
The Court inconsistently applies the political powerlessness factor. For
example, the Court requires some groups to prove that they lack political
power before they can receive judicial solicitude, but other classes do not
have to meet this standard. Because the Court has shifted from a suspect
class to a suspect classification standard, politically powerful groups
receive the same level of scrutiny for their equal protection claims as
politically vulnerable groups.188 Thus, race does not politically marginalize
whites, but when whites allege equal protection violations, the Court
applies strict scrutiny.189
This shifting use of process theory has led to unprincipled outcomes in
equal protection litigation. The Court has extended its highest level of
protection to historically advantaged classes, but it has concluded that
several historically disadvantaged groups should wage their battles for
equality in the political process.190 The Court, for example, consistently
applies strict scrutiny to racial discrimination claims asserted by whites.191
The Court, however, has held that equal protection claims by the poor,
elderly, and mentally disabled trigger only rational basis review.192 And
while the Court has not applied the suspect class doctrine to gay and
lesbian equal protection claims, several state and lower federal courts have
found that gays and lesbians do not constitute a suspect class.193 Many of
these rulings have turned on courts finding that gays and lesbians possess
political power.194
The next Part of this Article considers alternatives to the current
situation. First, it examines legal scholarship and recent precedent that
responds to the Court’s vague and inconsistent equal protection doctrine. It
then discusses some of the limitations and problems with these emerging
theories. Finally, the next Part will contribute to the emerging political
power discussion by suggesting two alternative approaches that could
inform a new equal protection doctrine.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra text accompanying notes 94–98.
See supra text accompanying notes 94–95.
See supra text accompanying notes 73 and 88.
See supra text accompanying notes 94–95.
See sources cited supra note 101.
See supra text accompanying notes 137–164.
See supra text accompanying notes 149–169.

HUTCHINSON FINAL 975-1034 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

5/4/2014 4:56 PM

“Not Without Political Power”

1007

IV. A NEW EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
A. Emerging Scholarly and Juridical Alternatives to the Court’s
Discussion of Equal Protection
The Supreme Court has never decided whether gays and lesbians
constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect class. Nevertheless, several state and
lower federal courts have examined this question.195 These cases have
involved challenges to many state and federal policies, including
prohibitions of same-sex marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act.196
The growing importance of the issue of political powerlessness in
contemporary equal protection cases—especially those adjudicating claims
of antigay discrimination—has recently led many scholars to produce
works on the subject. The works of these scholars and the rulings of federal
and state courts offer new ways of thinking about gay and lesbian equal
protection claims and generally about reforming Court doctrine interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause.
This Part analyzes the emerging judicial and scholarly analysis of
political powerlessness and equal protection. Although this body of
precedent and scholarship offers potential doctrinal improvements, some of
the positions that scholars and courts advance suffer from weaknesses as
well. After summarizing these developments and analyzing how they fall
short of providing a workable substitute for the Court’s problematic suspect
class doctrine, this Part will discuss additional matters that could inform the
development of a new theory of equal protection.
1. Discounting the Relevance of Political Powerlessness
The supreme courts of Connecticut and Iowa have held that denying
same-sex marriage to gay and lesbian individuals violates those states’
constitutions.197 Although the cases turned on the meaning of state law,
both courts followed Supreme Court precedent to decide the case.198 These
courts, however, addressed and sought to overcome many of the
weaknesses associated with the Court’s suspect class doctrine, including its
ambiguous and narrow definition of political powerlessness.
The Connecticut and Iowa courts attempted to overcome the limitations
of Supreme Court precedent by deemphasizing the relevance of political

195.
See supra text accompanying notes 137–184.
196.
See supra text accompanying notes 137–164.
197.
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009).
198.
See sources cited supra note 15.
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powerlessness to the suspect class doctrine. If political powerlessness is not
a prerequisite for heightened scrutiny, then the purported political power of
gays and lesbians would not preclude courts from giving the class judicial
solicitude. This logic guided both courts.
In Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that “immutability and minority status or political
powerlessness were subsidiary to the first two primary factors” of
relevance and history of discrimination.199 To justify this conclusion, the
court found that the Supreme Court extended “quasi-suspect” status to
women, even though they are not a “minority or truly politically
powerless.”200 Kerrigan also observed that the Court has applied strict
scrutiny in racial discrimination cases and in cases involving discrimination
against non-marital children without examining whether the affected
classes lack political power.201
Kerrigan found that Supreme Court doctrine “invariably has placed
dispositive weight” on a group’s history of discrimination and the
relevance of the trait that disadvantages the class.202 Thus, in Lyng v.
Castillo, the Supreme Court found that close relatives were not a quasisuspect class because they have not experienced a history of
discrimination.203 Kerrigan also found that in Cleburne, the Court’s
decision against treating mentally disabled individuals as a quasi-suspect
class turned on the relevance of mental disability for social policy.204
Furthermore, Kerrigan found that the elderly did not qualify as a suspect
class in Court precedent due to the relevance of age.205
The Iowa Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Varnum v.
Brien.206 Although the court included political powerlessness on a list of
factors that are relevant to a suspect class analysis, it determined that this
factor, along with immutability, merely “supplement[s] the analysis as a
means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny exists.”207
Varnum, like Kerrigan, described a history of discrimination and relevance
as “critical” and as “prerequisites” for finding that a group constitutes a
suspect or quasi-suspect class.208

199.
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427.
200.
Id. at 428.
201.
Id. at 428 & n.21.
202.
Id. at 427.
203.
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 428 n.21 (citing Lyng,
among other cases). Kerrigan misinterprets Lyng. See infra text accompanying notes 265–69.
204.
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426.
205.
Id. at 427.
206.
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
207.
Id. at 889.
208.
Id.
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Varnum borrowed substantially from Kerrigan. Varnum, like Kerrigan,
interpreted Brennan’s opinion in Frontiero as advocating suspect class
status to women, even though they were not politically powerless.209
Varnum also held that if political powerlessness were relevant to the
suspect class doctrine, blacks would not qualify for strict scrutiny:
By one measure—occupation of public office—the political
power of racial minorities is unbounded in this country today. This
fact was on display January 20, 2009, when Barack H. Obama, the
African-American son of a native Kenyan, was inaugurated as the
forty-fourth President of the United States of America.210
The Second Circuit also downplayed the relevance of political
powerlessness in Windsor v. United States, which held that the Defense of
Marriage Act violates the Equal Protection Clause.211 Although the court
considered political powerlessness a factor when applying the suspect class
doctrine, it held that this element was “not strictly necessary.”212
Within legal scholarship, William Eskridge provides the most extended
argument that plaintiffs need not demonstrate political powerlessness in
order to qualify for quasi-suspect status.213 Eskridge’s arguments closely
mirror the analyses in Kerrigan and Varnum. Eskridge argues that the
Court has only treated three factors as essential to the suspect class
doctrine: whether the class is “a coherent social group,” whether the group
has endured a “history of state discrimination,” and whether the trait that
makes the class vulnerable to discrimination “generally does not contribute
to legitimate public policies.”214 Eskridge, like the Connecticut and Iowa
supreme courts, relegates immutability and political powerlessness to
secondary status.215
Eskridge offers several justifications for his position. First, Eskridge
argues that in 1984, the Court did not mention political powerlessness as a
reason for applying strict scrutiny in Palmore v. Sidotti, a case that
invalidated a family court custody decision that catered to societal racial
stereotypes.216 Eskridge contends that it would have been “out of line” to
suggest that blacks lacked political power in 1984: “Not only had racial
minorities persuaded Congress, a generation earlier, to adopt the Civil
209.
Id. at 894.
210.
Id. at 894 n.21.
211.
699 F.3d 169 (2d Circuit 2012).
212.
Id. at 181, 188.
213.
See generally Eskridge, supra note 13.
214.
Id. at 10.
215.
Id. (“As far as I can tell, immutability and political powerlessness never have made a
difference in the Court’s ultimate determinations.”).
216.
466 U.S. 429 (1984); see Eskridge, supra note 13 at 11 (discussing Palmore).

HUTCHINSON FINAL 975-1034 (DO NOT DELETE)

1010

Alabama Law Review

5/4/2014 4:56 PM

[Vol. 65:4:975

Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but by 1984, racial
minorities were benefitting from race-based preferences in federal
legislation.”217
Eskridge also argues that Court doctrine regarding affirmative
action demonstrates the irrelevance of political powerlessness to the
suspect class doctrine.218 Because the Court applies strict scrutiny to
whites’ claims of racial discrimination, then political powerlessness cannot
operate as a prerequisite to heightened or strict scrutiny.219
Sex discrimination and the status of women also influence Eskridge’s
analysis. He argues that the application of intermediate scrutiny in sex
discrimination cases proves the irrelevance of political powerlessness.220
Following the analysis in Kerrigan and Varnum, Eskridge contends that
women do not lack political power and that Brennan’s opinion in Frontiero
demonstrates the irrelevance of political vulnerability to the suspect class
doctrine.221 Furthermore, Eskridge contends that because the Court first
applied intermediate scrutiny to a sex discrimination claim in Craig v.
Boren, a case with male plaintiffs, political powerlessness must have no
bearing on the application of heightened scrutiny.222
Echoing the analysis in Kerrigan and Varnum, Eskridge also asserts
that history of discrimination and relevance of the stigmatized trait are the
only essential factors in a determination to apply heightened scrutiny.223
Eskridge observes that in Lyng, the Court concluded that “close relatives”
do not constitute a suspect class because the trait has not been a
longstanding source of discrimination.224 Furthermore, he contends that in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the Court found that the
elderly do not qualify for heightened scrutiny solely on the grounds that
age is socially relevant and because the class has not suffered from
sustained historical discrimination.225 These arguments perfectly track the
reasoning in Kerrigan and Varnum.226
Eskridge has a more difficult time fitting Cleburne into his analysis.
The Court applied rational basis review after finding that mental disability
was a relevant trait and that the class failed to demonstrate political
217.
See Eskridge, supra note 13, at 11.
218.
Id. at 12 (“If political powerlessness was a requirement for strict scrutiny, almost all of these
affirmative action cases were wrongly decided.”).
219.
See id.
220.
Id.
221.
Id.
222.
Id. at 12–13 (“At almost half of the population, and by far the wealthier half, men are far
from politically powerless.”).
223.
Id. at 13.
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
226.
See supra text accompanying notes 199–205 (Kerrigan) and 206–210 (Varnum).
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powerlessness.227 Eskridge consciously struggles with the reasoning in
Cleburne and concedes that he is not sure “how to characterize” the
decision.228 Despite these reservations, Eskridge argues that Cleburne
cannot mean that groups must demonstrate political powerlessness to
qualify for heightened scrutiny. Although the Court explicitly considers
political powerlessness in Cleburne, Eskridge contends that this aspect of
the ruling has probably been overruled by subsequent affirmative action
precedent that applies strict scrutiny to whites’ equal protection claims.229
Finally, Eskridge departs from his doctrinal analysis and makes an
argument grounded in legal realism. Eskridge observes that political
powerlessness is irrelevant to the suspect class doctrine because the Court
has never applied intermediate or strict scrutiny when state action
discriminates against classes that completely lack political power.230
Instead, classes can only persuade the Court to provide them solicitude
after they have amassed enough power to convince politicians and the
public that the type of discrimination they face is improper. Groups that
lack political power altogether would not obtain favorable results with the
Court. Because judicial decision-making often rests on majoritarian beliefs,
classes that do not have the resources to influence the political process are
the very parties who will fail to receive judicial solicitude.
2. Rational Basis with a Bite
In Romer v. Evans, the Court held that Colorado Amendment 2
violated the Equal Protection Clause.231 The Court, however, never
considered whether gays and lesbians constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class. Instead, the Court held that Amendment 2 could not survive rational
basis review.232
Romer applied a more rigid version of rational basis review.233 The
Court placed its decision within a line of cases which hold that a
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” is patently
227.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985).
228.
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 14.
229.
Id.
230.
Id. at 17–19.
231.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1995).
232.
Id. at 632.
233.
Id. at 632–33; Michael Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s
Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1343–44 (2011) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–
78 (2003)) (observing that “the Supreme Court . . . has applied a kind of rational basis scrutiny ‘with
bite’ in cases involving gay rights”); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite:
Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications
Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005); Steven P. Wieland, Note,
Gambling, Greyhounds, and Gay Marriage: How the Iowa Supreme Court Can Use the Rational-Basis
Test to Address Varnum v. Brien, 94 IOWA L. REV. 413, 436–37 (2008).
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irrational.234 Similarly, in Romer, the Court ruled that Amendment 2
violated the Constitution because it expressed “animus” against gays and
lesbians.235
Although rational basis review is traditionally the Court’s most
deferential analysis, several legal scholars have attempted to justify a more
stringent version. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, for example,
persuasively argue that when state action relegates a class of people to the
status of “pariahs,” it cannot withstand rational basis review.236
Romer has influenced other decisions as well. Justice O’Connor, for
example, utilized the animus doctrine in her concurring opinion in
Lawrence v. Texas.237 Lawrence invalidated a Texas statute that
criminalized same-sex sodomy.238 The Court held that the law deprived
gays and lesbians of due process.239 Justice O’Connor agreed that the law
violated the Constitution, but she argued that it denied equal protection to
gays and lesbians.240 Applying the animus doctrine recognized in Romer,
O’Connor argued that the statute was irrational because it criminalized gay
and lesbian status.241
Furthermore, in United States v. Windsor the Court held that DOMA
violates the Equal Protection Clause.242 Although the Second Circuit held
that gays and lesbians constitute a quasi-suspect class, the Court abandoned
that analysis. Instead, the Court held that the “avowed purpose and
practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages
made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”243 In other words,
Congress enacted DOMA in order to express animus against gays and
lesbians. This purpose fails rational basis review.
234.
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
235.
Id. at 632.
236.
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT 257, 266
(1996) (“To be a pariah is to be shunned and isolated, to be treated as if one had a loathsome and
contagious disease. The message is that outcasts are not merely inferior; they are not fully human, and
contact with them is dangerous and degrading.”); see also Akhil Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2:
Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996).
237.
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
238.
Id. at 578.
239.
See generally id.
240.
Id. at 579.
241.
Id. at 584 (citing Romer as authority); id. at 585 (“A law branding one class of persons as
criminal based solely on the State’s moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that
class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard
of review.”).
242.
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013).
243.
Id. at 2693.
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B. Critiquing Emerging Discourse
The emergent equal protection discourse has rightfully criticized Court
doctrine for its inconsistency and vagueness. Nonetheless, these new
theories also fall short in several ways. In particular, discounting the
relevance of political powerlessness ignores how scholars and courts have
traditionally interpreted the Equal Protection Clause. Discarding political
powerlessness could also negatively impact other protected classes. In
addition, while current doctrine legitimizes the animus rationale, use of this
precedent does not lead to fairly predictable results. Furthermore, these
new approaches often employ narrow definitions of political
powerlessness—a flaw that also weakens the Court’s suspect class
doctrine.
1. Problems Associated with Discarding of Political Powerlessness
a. Strained or Incorrect Interpretation of Doctrine
Arguments that discount or deemphasize the relevance of political
powerlessness in a suspect class analysis suffer from several flaws. First,
these arguments rest on strained and contradictory interpretations of the
Court’s doctrine. For example, Eskridge argues that application of strict
scrutiny in race-based affirmative action cases and intermediate scrutiny to
sex discrimination claims brought by men proves that political
powerlessness is not an essential part of the suspect class doctrine.244 On
the other hand, Eskridge argues that a history of discrimination and
relevance is critical to such a discussion.245 These conclusions, however,
contradict one another. If the application of strict scrutiny to whites’ equal
protection claims proves the irrelevance of political powerlessness to the
suspect doctrine, then it also demonstrates that a history of discrimination
is insignificant as well. Whites do not have a history of racial
discrimination, but they still receive strict scrutiny of their racial
discrimination claims.246 Eskridge’s logic compels the conclusion that
political powerlessness and a history of discrimination are immaterial to
the suspect class doctrine.
Also, opinions and scholarship that dismiss the doctrinal significance
of political powerlessness misread Frontiero. Brennan argued that the
Court should apply strict scrutiny to claims brought by women.247 Eskridge,
following Varnum and Kerrigan, argues the Brennan’s conclusion
244.
245.
246.
247.

Eskridge, supra note 13, at 12–13.
Id. at 11.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
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demonstrates the insignificance of political vulnerability to the suspect
class doctrine.248 In support of this conclusion, Kerrigan, Varnum, and
Eskridge contend that Brennan conceded that women do not lack political
power.249 This reading of Frontiero is misleading.
Frontiero indeed states that “women do not constitute a small and
powerless minority.”250 But Varnum, Kerrigan, and Eskridge take this
language out of its full context in order to suggest the insignificance of
political powerlessness. The complete passage in Frontiero states that:
It is true, of course, that when viewed in the abstract, women do
not constitute a small and powerless minority. Nevertheless, in part
because of past discrimination, women are vastly underrepresented
in this Nation’s decisionmaking councils. There has never been a
female President, nor a female member of this Court. Not a single
woman presently sits in the United States Senate, and only 14
women hold seats in the House of Representatives. And, as
appellants point out, this underrepresentation is present throughout
all levels of our State and Federal Government.251
Contrary to recent assertions in scholarship and case law, Brennan does not
contend that women are politically powerful. While it might appear that
women are powerful in the abstract, this view is disproved by the reality of
sexist discrimination. Due to past discrimination and other factors, women
lack political power, as their vast underrepresentation in state and federal
leadership positions demonstrates.
While Brennan does not say that women are completely devoid of
political power, he rejects a superficial examination of women’s political
strength that only considers their demographic majority or the recent
enactment of legislation that prohibits sex discrimination. The absence of
women in positions of power within the state and federal government also
determines the amount of power they possess.
Brennan also treated political powerlessness as a part of the suspect
class doctrine in two additional cases. He authored the opinion for the
Court in Plyler v. Doe, which invalidated a Texas law that denied free
248.
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 12.
249.
Id. (“Although Justice Brennan mentioned that women still were discriminated against and
underrepresented in the political arena, his opinion suggested that however ‘underrepresented’ women
were in the halls of Congress, they were far from ‘politically powerless’ in the 1970s.”); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009) (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685–88 & n.17) (arguing that
“females enjoyed at least some measure of political power when the Supreme Court first heightened its
scrutiny of gender classifications”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 428 (Conn.
2008) (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17) (arguing that the Court “has accorded quasi-suspect
status to a group that had not been a minority or truly politically powerless”).
250.
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17.
251.
Id. (emphasis added).
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public education to undocumented children.252 Plyler listed the factors that
determine whether a class deserves heightened or strict scrutiny. This list
includes: the enactment of legislation that reflects “deep-seated prejudice”;
whether the law is “irrelevant to any proper legislative goal”; and
“[f]inally,” whether the group has “historically been ‘relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process.’”253 Rather than discounting
political powerlessness as a factor, Brennan placed it at the center of
analysis, just like history of discrimination and relevance.
In Plyler, Brennan also found that undocumented status is relevant for
legislators to consider.254 Kerrigan, Varnum, and Eskridge, however,
contend that a trait’s social irrelevance constitutes a strict prerequisite for
heightened scrutiny. Yet, in Plyler, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny
to the equal protection claim of undocumented children. Rather than
treating the class as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, however, the Court
applies a more demanding level of scrutiny due to the importance of
education to the economic and psychological well-being of these children
and their inability to control their undocumented status.255
Brennan also considered political powerlessness in Rowland v. Mad
River Local School District.256 In Rowland, Brennan, along with Justice
Marshall, dissented from the denial of certiorari in a case that challenged
the constitutionality of firing a public school teacher solely on the basis of
her bisexual status.257 Brennan argued that the case raised important
“constitutional questions,” including whether the discharge violated the
Equal Protection Clause.258 Brennan argued, in part, that gays and lesbians
constitute a “significant and insular minority.”259 This formulation comes
from footnote four of Carolene Products, which is one of the most cited
cases for political process theory.260 Frontiero, Plyler, and Rowland all lead
to the conclusion that Brennan (and the Court) has considered political
powerlessness relevant to the suspect class doctrine and to the application
of heightened scrutiny.

252.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
253.
Id. at 216–17 n.14 (quoting San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)).
254.
Id. at 219 n.19 (“In addition, it could hardly be suggested that undocumented status is a
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”); id. at 220 (“Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any
proper legislative goal.”).
255.
Id. at 223–24 (demanding “substantial” justification for a law that “imposes a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status”).
256.
470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
257.
Id.
258.
Id. at 1014.
259.
Id.
260.
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
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Arguments that dismiss the relevance of political powerlessness in
Court doctrine also rest on questionable interpretations of Murgia. The
Court clearly denied heightened scrutiny to the elderly after finding that
they have not suffered from a “history of purposeful unequal treatment or
been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of [an irrelevant trait].”261
But this holding alone does not negate the importance of political
powerlessness. First, Murgia listed political powerlessness as a factor that
impacts a suspect class analysis.262 Furthermore, the Court also found that
the elderly did not constitute a suspect class because the class was not a
“‘discrete and insular’ group in need of ‘extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.’”263 The Court instead found that “[old age]
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span.”264
Other cases cited to support the irrelevance of political powerlessness
do not substantiate this contention. Kerrigan, for example, observed that
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lyng v. Castillo265 supported the conclusion
that if a class cannot demonstrate a history of discrimination or relevance,
then “its claim to suspect or quasi-suspect class status invariably has been
rejected without regard to the extent of its political power.”266 Eskridge
cites Lyng for a similar proposition.267 Lyng, however, does not stand for
this proposition. Instead, the Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny in
Lyng for multiple reasons, namely, that close relatives “have not been
subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they
are not a minority or politically powerless.”268
In addition to the foregoing precedent, legal scholars and courts have
overwhelmingly treated political powerlessness as a significant factor in the
suspect class doctrine.269 Recent judicial opinions and legal scholarship that
261.
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
262.
Id. at 313 (“[A] suspect class is one ‘saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’” (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))).
263.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152–53 n.4 (1938)).
264.
Id. at 313–14.
265.
477 U.S. 635 (1986).
266.
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 428 n.21 (Conn. 2008).
267.
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 13 (“Thus, in Lyng v. Castillo, the Court ruled that the food
stamp program’s exclusion of ‘close relatives’ from households was not subject to strict scrutiny,
primarily because that classification has not been applied in an oppressive way in the past.”).
268.
Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added).
269.
See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward AntiOrthodoxy and Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1671, 1686–87 (2000); Holning Lau, Identity Scripts &
Democratic Deliberation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 897, 942 (2010); Levy, supra note 20, at 38–39; Osagie K.
Obasogie, Can the Blind Lead the Blind? Rethinking Equal Protection Jurisprudence Through an
Empirical Examination of Blind People’s Understanding of Race, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 705, 718

HUTCHINSON FINAL 975-1034 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

“Not Without Political Power”

5/4/2014 4:56 PM

1017

discount the relevance of political powerlessness fail to engage this
literature and precedent. Calling into doubt this voluminous scholarship
and precedent requires more than a strained and incomplete reading of
Court doctrine.
Eskridge makes a final point about the relationship between political
powerlessness and the suspect class doctrine that is somewhat persuasive.
He contends that groups that lack political power in the “deepest” meaning
of the word will never qualify for heightened scrutiny.270 Eskridge observes
that racial and sex discrimination did not become suspect categories until
blacks and women had enough power to convince the Court and society
that racism and sexism were inconsistent with equality.271 Thus, cultural
judgments, rather than legal abstraction alone, determine whether state
action derives from prejudice or rational processes.272
Although he does not consider the following explanation, Eskridge’s
argument that the Court makes cultural judgments about the
appropriateness of certain forms of discrimination is quite plausible.
Numerous social scientists have produced empirical studies that
demonstrate that Court rulings tend to mirror known public opinion. This
finding holds true even in civil rights cases, although many people tend to
view the Court as a guardian of minority interests.273 Accordingly, unless
disadvantaged classes can convince the larger culture, and thus the Court,
that the discrimination they face offends broader notions of equality, these
groups will not receive judicial solicitude. Undoubtedly, a group’s ability
to affect cultural norms and popular opinion is a function of its political
power.
That the Court follows cultural norms when it decides equal protection
cases, however, does not remove political powerlessness from the list of
formal factors that courts apply in a suspect class analysis. Instead, equal
protection precedent and legal scholarship make it abundantly clear that
judges have often considered a group’s political vulnerability in order to
decide whether the group constitutes a suspect class. That women and
people of color successfully labored to modify public and judicial opinion
regarding sexism and racism does not mean that these groups are politically
powerful in the sense that they no longer suffer abuses in the political
process. Instead, it means that the power they have, though sufficient to

(2013); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 34; Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right
to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1408 (2010); Yoshino, supra note 12, at 565; see also supra text
accompanying notes 55–91 (discussing case law considering political powerlessness).
270.
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 17.
271.
Id. at 18–19.
272.
Id. at 19.
273.
See Hutchinson, supra note 31.
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bring about some remedial measures, does not immunize them from
mistreatment.
Finally, the application of strict scrutiny in equal protection cases
brought by whites or intermediate scrutiny in cases filed by men does not
prove the insignificance of political powerlessness. First, numerous
scholars and judges have criticized the Court’s affirmative action
jurisprudence precisely because it treats race-based remedies as
presumptively unconstitutional.274
Furthermore, in sex discrimination cases, a majority of the Court first
applied intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren—a case that sustained an
equal protection challenge brought by male plaintiffs.275 Craig, however,
does not negate the significance of political powerlessness in the suspect
class doctrine. It is important to consider the complete history surrounding
Craig and the elevation of sex to a quasi-suspect classification. For over a
century, women had lobbied state legislatures and Congress for civil rights
measures. Women had also challenged commonly-held cultural beliefs
about the role of the sexes in society.276 Yet, the Court did not invalidate a
law that discriminated against women until it decided Reed v. Reed in
1971.277 Although the Court did not elevate sex to a protected category, it
applied a rather strong version of rational basis.278
When the Court decided Reed, the Civil Rights Movement had already
successfully lobbied for the enactment of laws that required formal racial
equality in numerous policy settings. Furthermore, the Women’s Rights
Movement was becoming far more influential and important among
lawmakers, judges, and the public.279 By the time the Court decided
Frontiero in 1976, the Equal Rights Amendment was pending in the states,
and Congress had passed several laws that prohibited discrimination on the
basis of sex.280 And while a majority of the Court could not agree on a
274.
See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 22
(1995) (questioning the application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action policies); see also Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387–402 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part) (criticizing
the Court for applying strict scrutiny in affirmative action case).
275.
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
276.
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1358–1414 (2006) (discussing long
history of social movement advocacy contesting subordination of women).
277.
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
278.
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1024 (1986) (“In Reed v. Reed, the Court purported to use rational basis scrutiny in striking
down an Idaho statute that provided a mandatory preference for males over females in the selection of
the administrators of estates, but the Court actually applied a heightened level of scrutiny.”) (internal
footnote omitted).
279.
Siegel, supra note 276, at 1376–77 (discussing accomplishments of Women’s Rights
Movement during 1960s).
280.
Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 311 (2001).
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reason to invalidate the sexist law in Frontiero, the plurality would have
applied strict scrutiny, and the concurring judges would have applied the
stronger version of rational basis that the Court used in Reed.281
Thus, Reed and Frontiero demonstrate that the Court had already
begun shifting its views on the permissibility of sex discrimination when it
decided Craig. Because the Women’s Rights Movement greatly influenced
the country’s political culture and its elite institutions, the decisions in
these cases did not stray dramatically from mainstream public opinion.282 It
is true that when the Court finally settled on intermediate scrutiny in Craig,
men were the plaintiffs. But this fact does not necessarily mean the suspect
class doctrine had become judicially irrelevant in Craig. Instead, a more
plausible reading of Craig suggests that the Court had already moved
towards a heightened standard for sex discrimination in Reed and
Frontiero. Indeed, the Court’s decision to apply intermediate scrutiny in
Craig rests primarily upon the history of sex discrimination that women
have endured.283 The Oklahoma statute invalidated in Craig, however,
invidiously discriminated in favor of women, rather than remedying past
discrimination against them.284 If the law served a benign purpose, the
Court might have applied ordinary rational basis review. Subsequent to
Craig, however, the Court has utilized the same problematic suspect
classification doctrine that it applies in racial discrimination cases.
b. Acquiescing in the Assumption of Gay and Lesbian Power
Finally, retreating from the political powerlessness requirement
suggests that courts and scholars have acquiesced in the assumption that
gays and lesbians are a powerful class. One of the most persistent and
harmful stereotypes portrays gays and lesbians as a wealthy, powerful, and
well-educated class. Gays and lesbians use their power to dominate the
political process. Gays and lesbians, therefore, do not deserve judicial
solicitude. On the contrary, they have the full attention of lawmakers.285
Furthermore, when political majorities enact or support measures that

281.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny); id. at 691
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (applying the Reed standard); id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment) (applying the Reed standard).
282.
See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution:
The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 32–36 (2005) (discussing social movement
strategy of influencing public and elite opinion).
283.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (discussing precedent invalidating policies that
rest on archaic stereotypes of women).
284.
Id. at 198 n.6 (distinguishing Oklahoma statute from laws upheld in previous cases that
remedied discrimination against women).
285.
Schacter, supra note 24, at 291–94.
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disadvantage gays and lesbians, this is simply the product of representative
democracy rather than animosity or prejudice.286
Countermovements to gay and lesbian rights have frequently
disparaged as special rights any policy that prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. For example, during the political mobilization
to pass Colorado Amendment 2, a conservative organization created and
distributed a video called Gay Rights/Special Rights, which described gays
and lesbians as a powerful class that does not suffer from subordination.287
Justice Scalia used this stereotype to describe gays and lesbians in his
dissent in Romer v. Evans:
The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to retain social
disapprobation of homosexuality) is that, because those who
engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate
numbers in certain communities, have high disposable income,
and, of course care, about homosexual-rights issues much more
ardently than the public at large, they possess political power much
greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide. Quite
understandably, they devote this political power to achieving not
merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of
homosexuality.288
Justice Scalia argued that the passage of Amendment 2 did not evince
hatred of gays and lesbians. Instead, voters who favored the amendment
simply wanted to restore the moral status quo in the state against the efforts
of a powerful interest group to reshape the laws to its own advantage
through the enactment of special rights.289
Justice Scalia’s comments closely follow the political rhetoric used to
contest civil rights measures for gays and lesbians. Compare, for example,
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Romer with a 1993 statement
delivered by the Christian Coalition of Hawaii to the state senate during
debates over same-sex marriage:

286.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[H]omosexuals are
as entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of their moral sentiments as is the rest of society.
But they are subject to being countered by lawful, democratic countermeasures as well.”). The trial
court in the Romer case made a similar argument. See Evans v. Romer, Civ. A. No. 92 CV 7223, 1993
WL 518586, at *12 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) (“Because the gay position has been defeated in
certain elections, such as Amendment 2, does not mean gays are particularly politically vulnerable or
powerless. It merely shows that they lost that election.”).
287.
Schacter, supra note 24, at 292; Hutchinson, supra note 24, at 1375.
288.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
289.
Id. at 647 (“[Amendment 2] put directly, to all the citizens of the State, the question: Should
homosexuality be given special protection? They answered no. The Court today asserts that this most
democratic of procedures is unconstitutional.”).

HUTCHINSON FINAL 975-1034 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

“Not Without Political Power”

5/4/2014 4:56 PM

1021

“While comprising less than 2% of the population, homosexuals do
not constitute a discriminated minority but in reality are better
educated with a higher level of income and are more politically
sophisticated than the average population. In fact, they are a radical
liberal special interest group using their political and economic
clout to force their radical agenda on the majority of the
population. Their agenda is not about civil rights, but an agenda for
special prividges [sic] based upon sexual preference.”290
Scalia’s dissent sounds exactly like a political document against gay and
lesbian rights.
As applied in the gay and lesbian context, the special rights rhetoric is
fallacious because it assumes that gays and lesbians possess greater wealth
than the general public. Several empirical studies, however, debunk the
myth of gay and lesbian wealth. These studies show that gay or lesbian
sexual identity negatively impacts employment opportunities and
income.291 Other studies show acute economic deprivation for many gays
and lesbians.292 For example, many studies find that well over 30 percent of
homeless teenagers in large urban centers are gay or lesbian.293 Family
conflict over sexual orientation is a leading cause of homelessness among
gay and lesbian youth.294 These teens often turn to sex work and criminal
behavior in order to survive.295 Predictably, many of them also suffer from

290.
Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller & Neal Milner, Rights as Excess: Understanding the Politics of
Special Rights, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1075, 1083 (2003) (quoting Haw. House Judiciary Comm.
Hearing on Same-Sex Marriage (Haw. 1993) (statement of Rosemary Garciduenas, State Director of
the Christian Coalition of Hawaii) (transcript available at Speech Collections, University of Hawaii
Library, Honolulu)).
291.
M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 726 (1995) (finding gay and bisexual men earn less than heterosexual men, but results
for lesbians not statistically consistent); Nathan Berg & Donald Lien, Measuring the Effect of Sexual
Orientation on Income: Evidence of Discrimination?, 20 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 394 (2002) (finding
gay and bisexual men earn less than heterosexual men, but results for lesbians not statistically
consistent); Dan A. Black et al., The Earnings Effects of Sexual Orientation, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 449 (2003) (finding gay and bisexual men earn less than heterosexual men, but lesbians earn more
than heterosexual women); Christopher S. Carpenter, Revisiting the Income Penalty for Behaviorally
Gay Men: Evidence from NHANES III, 14 LABOUR ECON. 25 (2007) (finding lower income for gay
men than heterosexual men).
292.
Laura F. Redman, Outing the Invisible Poor: Why Economic Justice and Access to Health
Care Is an LGBT Issue, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 451 (2010) (discussing economic
deprivation and LGBT individuals); see also RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY,
AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY (2009), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/Albelda-Badgett-Schneebaum-Gates-LGB-Poverty-Report-March-2009.pdf.
293.
Ernst Hunter, What’s Good for the Gays Is Good for the Gander: Making Homeless Youth
Housing Safer for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 543, 545 (2008).
294.
Id.; see also Bryan N. Cochran et al., Challenges Faced by Homeless Sexual Minorities:
Comparison of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Homeless Adolescents with Their
Heterosexual Counterparts, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 773, 774 (2002).
295.
Hunter, supra note 293, at 545.
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untreated mental illnesses, which can lead to substance abuse, alcoholism,
and suicide.296 They also suffer from physical abuse and are very
susceptible to contracting HIV and other infections.297 Many existing
homeless shelters that offer services for youth are ill-prepared to address
the special needs of this population.298
Other empirical studies have examined the impact of poverty,
homophobia, and racism upon low-income gays and lesbians of color. For
example, the rate of HIV and AIDS among black gay and bisexual men is
the highest of any gay and bisexual demographic group.299 The rate among
Latino gay and bisexual men is also disproportionately high.300 Some
researchers attribute this higher rate of infection to emotional distress that
results from exposure to multiple sources of disempowerment, such as
racism, xenophobia, homophobia, and poverty.301
Although some gays and lesbians undoubtedly have wealth and power,
the class as a whole suffers economic detriment due to societal
discrimination. Many persons in the class, moreover, live in conditions of
extreme deprivation. They are not politically powerful. Instead, they are a
prime example of a powerless minority that needs protection from an
abusive political process.
Rather than examining poverty and political powerlessness among gays
and lesbians, many legal commentators and judges seek to discount the
relevance of this factor in equal protection doctrine. Although this strategy
might lead to temporary litigation success, it wastes the opportunity to
document the suffering among the most marginalized gays and lesbians.
This strategy also risks ignoring the needs of poor gays and lesbians.
Indeed, many scholars have questioned whether some of the interests that
are most heavily pursued by gay and lesbian social movement

296.
Id. at 545–46; see also Cochran, supra note 294, at 774–75.
297.
Hunter, supra note 293, at 545.
298.
Id. at 546–52.
299.
See HIV Among Gay and Bisexual Men, CENT. FOR DISEASE CONTROL FACT SHEET, May
2012, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/library_factsheet_HIV_among_GayBisexualMen
.pdf (“Among all gay and bisexual men, blacks/African Americans bear the greatest disproportionate
burden of HIV.”).
300.
See HIV Among Latinos, CENT. FOR DISEASE CONTROL FACT SHEET, Nov. 2011, at 1,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets/pdf/latino.pdf (“In 2009, Latino men who
have sex with men . . . accounted for 81% . . . of new HIV infections among all Latino men and 20%
among all MSM.”).
301.
Rafael M. Diaz, George Ayala & Edward Bein, Sexual Risk as an Outcome of Social
Oppression: Data from a Probability Sample of Latino Gay Men in Three U.S. Cities, 10 CULTURAL
DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCH. 255 (2004). Geography could also determine the extent to
which gays and lesbians possess power. Although many gays and lesbians live in small cities and rural
areas, they are not the subject of much academic research. More studies are necessary to document their
experiences with subordination. See Emily Kazyak, Disrupting Cultural Selves: Constructing Gay and
Lesbian Identities in Rural Locales, 34 QUALITATIVE SOC. 561 (2011).
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organizations will actually benefit poor persons.302 It is unclear, for
example, how marriage or the lifting of the ban on gays and lesbians in the
military will alleviate the plight of homeless youth or reduce the violence
and sexual exploitation they endure. Furthermore, the connection between
popular gay and lesbian social movement initiatives, on the one hand, and
the needs of poor persons of color (who suffer from a lack of adequate
healthcare and from the negative mental health consequences of racism,
sexism, heterosexism, and poverty) on the other hand, is not readily
discernible.303
c. Validating Court’s Hostility to Race-Based Remedies
Treating political powerlessness as irrelevant to an equal protection
analysis would also validate the Court precedent that treats race-based
remedies with extreme suspicion. Presently, the Court shifts between two
contradictory doctrines in equal protection cases. Although the Court has
historically considered whether state action impermissibly burdens certain
classes that lack power in the political process, today it polices the use of
suspect classifications.304
The class-to-classification shift has led to the judicial invalidation of
race-based remedial state action such as affirmative action, reverse racial
gerrymandering, and primary school reassignments that seek to alleviate
the racial isolation of students of color. Political powerlessness and process
theory are irrelevant in these cases. When legal scholars argue that courts
should formally discard consideration of political powerlessness in equal
protection cases, they risk legitimizing Court doctrine that treats racially
remedial policies as materially indistinct from Jim Crow laws and other
forms of state-imposed racial hierarchy.
2. Criticizing Rational Basis with Bite
a. Adds Another Tier to Equal Protection
For several reasons, the application of a rigid rational basis review
creates a very problematic equal protection doctrine. First, rational basis

302.
See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Latina Multidimensionality and LatCrit
Possibilities: Culture, Gender, and Sex, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811 (1999) (discussing complexity of
Latino/a identity by analyzing sexuality); Hutchinson, supra note 24, at 1368–72 (analyzing race and
sexuality); Robinson, supra note 28 (arguing that dominant racial and class assumptions regarding gay
men lead to inadequate and harmful policies for poor persons of color).
303.
See Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, TUL. J.L. &
SEXUALITY 31, 51 n.75 (1991); Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401, 404 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
304.
See supra text accompanying notes 125–136.
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with a bite implicitly adds an additional tier to equal protection scrutiny.305
While many commentators and jurists believe that the Court should
abandon the tiered analysis altogether, the Court has made it even more
complicated by creating stronger rational basis review, weaker and stronger
versions of intermediate scrutiny, and, recently, flexible application of
strict scrutiny.306
b. Unpredictable Results
Furthermore, the Court has not articulated a clear test for determining
whether a policy reflects animus. In Romer, the Court concluded that
Colorado voters supported Amendment 2 as a result of hostility to gays and
lesbians.307 To reach this conclusion, the Court considered the sweeping
disability that the amendment imposed upon a small minority within the
state.308 This analysis, however, should not provide the only basis for
determining whether a law stems from animus. For example, if
Amendment 2 imposed narrower harms, but the law contained an antigay
slur, certainly such language would constitute evidence of animus. Laws,
however, rarely contain such explicit statements of hostility.309 This fact
makes the animus approach an incoherent and unpredictable alternative to
strict and intermediate scrutiny.310
Rational basis with a bite diminishes the predictability of the doctrine
because it widens the discretion that judges have with respect to equal
protection cases. If the legitimacy of laws that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation depends solely upon a finding that the law rests on
animus towards gays and lesbians, then judges will have more
305.
Smith, supra note 233, at 2774.
306.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny, but holding that
Court must “defer” to defendant’s assessment of its educational mission); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,
74 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“While the Court invokes heightened scrutiny, the manner in
which it explains and applies this standard is a stranger to our precedents.”); Jill Elaine Hasday, The
Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public
Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 771 n.75 (2002) (observing that numerous scholars contend the
Court has elevated the standard in sex discrimination cases to strict scrutiny (citing many sources)); see
also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004) (advocating single
standard for all equal protection cases); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 397 (1998) (criticizing proliferation of tiers in equal protection doctrine beyond the three
formal standards).
307.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
308.
Id.
309.
In Windsor, the Court held that DOMA expressed animus towards same-sex married couples
because it deviated from Congress’s traditional deference to states regarding the definition of marriage,
deprives these couples of over 1,000 federal benefits, and because the legislative history and title of the
statute demonstrate hatred toward these couples. See Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690–
96 (2013).
310.
Dorf, supra note 233, at 1344 (describing rational basis with a bite as an “unstable”
alternative to intermediate scrutiny).
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opportunities to uphold heterosexist state action. At the same time, judges
could also use this wide discretion to strike down such measures. Consider,
for example, the issue of adoption by same-sex couples. In Lofton v.
Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld a Florida law that prohibited adoptions by “homosexuals.”311
Applying a very deferential version of rational basis review, the Court
found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Florida enacted the law due
to animus against gays and lesbians.312 The Court reasoned that the law was
not a sweeping burden on gays and lesbians, like Amendment 2, and that
the state’s belief that children need opposite-sex parents was rational.313
By contrast, a Florida trial court subsequently found that the adoption
ban violated the Equal Protection Clause.314 The court applied rational basis
review and rejected the same arguments that the Eleventh Circuit held
constituted a legitimate basis for the law.315 The Florida court found that
the law was “illogical to the point of irrationality.”316
c. Avoiding a Critique of Heteronormativity
In addition to making equal protection doctrine less predictable, the
application of one of two versions of rational basis review in sexual
orientation equal protection cases allows the Court to evade addressing the
general question of whether heterosexism is consistent with the
Constitution. Under the current approach, a law rooted in heterosexism and
animus is unconstitutional. State action rooted in heterosexism without
animus, however, is permissible. Some scholars might praise this flexible
approach because it allows the political process to shape constitutional
discourse related to sexual orientation.317 In this setting, however, rational
basis review ultimately means that the Court retains the power to validate
most majoritarian policies that disadvantage gays and lesbians without
examining whether heterosexism generally offends the Equal Protection
Clause. When the impermissibility of heterosexist state action requires a
finding of governmental animus, equal protection for gays and lesbians is
theoretically and practically incomplete.

311.
358 F.3d 804, 827 (2004).
312.
Id. at 826–27.
313.
Id.
314.
In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *29 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
315.
See generally id.
316.
Id. at *28 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children and
Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004)) (disagreeing with denial of en banc review).
317.
See William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal
Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 537–39 (2005) (discussing the understanding of rational basis review
as recognition of the Court’s limited role in a democracy).
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3. Replicating Problematic Understanding of Political Power
Some of the recent precedent and legal scholarship related to the
suspect class doctrine also replicate the Court’s narrow understanding of
political powerlessness. Kerrigan, Varnum, and Eskridge describe women
as politically powerful solely due to their numerical majority and the
existence of laws that protect them from discrimination.318 This conclusion,
however, ignores the economic inequality associated with sex and the
underrepresentation of women in offices of political power.
Eskridge argues that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 demonstrate the political power of blacks.319 But this
view ignores the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870
and that large numbers of blacks in the South could not vote until nearly a
century later.320 Also, Congress only enacted these measures after decades
of protests and very public and violent subjugation of blacks during and
before the Civil Rights Movement. The 1960s civil rights legislation was
not the product of the routine exertion of political power. Instead, a
culmination of demonstrations, litigation, international affairs, violence,
and grave personal sacrifices created these changes. Furthermore, the Court
has recently weakened the Voting Rights Act on the grounds that fifty
years of protection has obviated the need for federal monitoring of states
and counties with the most egregious records of racism with respect to
election laws.321 Today, these remedies are “racial entitlements.”322
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court suggested that blacks no longer suffer
political powerlessness because Barack Obama is President.323 Obama’s
election does not alter the substantive inequality that blacks and other
persons of color experience.324 This type of reasoning does not provide a
helpful solution for the problems associated with the Court’s equal
protection doctrine. Instead, this view of political power legitimizes the
denial of civil rights and remedies for vulnerable populations.

318.
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 428 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009); Eskridge, supra note 13, at 22.
319.
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 11.
320.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
321.
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
322.
Scalia made this comment during oral arguments in Shelby. See Adam Liptak, Voting Rights
Law Draws Skepticism from Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV 917 (2008) (discussing characterization of race-based remedies
as special handouts to blacks).
323.
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 894 n.21.
324.
Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2010) (dismissing the assumption that Obama’s
election demonstrates the end of racial subordination).
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C. Repairing Equal Protection Doctrine
This Subpart of the Article suggests two possible alternatives that could
help improve equal protection doctrine. The Court could create a more
sophisticated definition of political powerlessness that reflects the multiple
factors that cause political vulnerability. On the other hand, the Court could
scrap the suspect class doctrine altogether and create a normative theory of
equal protection. Political powerlessness, however, could remain an
important factor in either of the two alternatives.
1. Rework Political Powerlessness
The Court’s equal protection doctrine employs a vague and narrow
definition of political powerlessness. The Court also inconsistently applies
this doctrine. Cleburne epitomizes the narrowness of the Court’s definition
of political power. The existence of scattered legislation that benefits a
class evinces its ability to defeat majoritarian mistreatment.325 This is a
terribly “coarse” view of political powerlessness.326 In fact, if existing
suspect and quasi-suspect classes had to satisfy this constrained
formulation, they would all fail.327 Although scholars have criticized the
narrowness of Cleburne, only a few have offered a broader definition of
political powerlessness.328
Although the size of a group could influence its political success, size
alone does not offer a comprehensive accounting of political power. Large
groups, like women, can suffer from political vulnerability; small groups,
like wealthy white men, can possess power which greatly exceeds their
numbers. And as Bruce Ackerman argued over two decades ago, a group
that lacks a discrete or visible trait, such as gays and lesbians, might endure
burdens in the political process because its members can opt out and
deprive the class of a cohesive political voice.329 Nevertheless, discreteness
and insularity do not necessarily translate into political advantages. The
social construction of race and ongoing racism, both conscious and
unconscious, hinder the ability of persons of color to achieve many of their
political goals.330
Political science scholarship related to power could help overcome the
limitations of the current doctrine. Political scientists, as opposed to most
325.
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
326.
Yoshino, supra note 12, at 565.
327.
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 467.
328.
But see Yoshino, supra note 12, at 565–66.
329.
See Ackerman, supra note 143.
330.
Farber & Sherry, supra note 236; Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117
YALE L.J 734, 773–88 (2008).
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lawyers, have extensively studied how to define and measure power. Their
scholarship provides many additional factors to consider when discussing a
group’s ability to create change in the political process. Contrary to the
narrow understanding of power in legal scholarship and judicial opinions,
political scientists consider wealth, public opinion, time and cost
impediments, influence upon the media, prejudice, whether the group fails
to mobilize because it has been conditioned for political losses, and if prior
changes have actually resulted in the advancement of the interests of
elites—rather than the betterment of the class.331 This expanded list of
factors should inform equal protection analysis.
2. Beyond the Suspect Class Doctrine: Normative Theory
A more difficult path could lead to the elaboration of a normative
theory of equal protection. Although the Equal Protection Clause is
expressed in general terms, the Court’s judicial review power includes the
authority to “say what the law is.”332 Since the demise of Lochner and the
settling of the New Deal standoff between President Roosevelt and the
judiciary, the Court has attempted to allay the concerns of critics who
believe judicial review is inconsistent with democracy.333
Political process theory, however, does not successfully avoid the
antidemocracy critiques of judicial review. Although process theory
facially polices only the political process, it offers subjective judgments
about which forms of prejudice warrant Supreme Court protection.334
Because the Court already makes subjective judgments about
discrimination, it could discard the veil of neutrality associated with
process theory and strengthen its equal protection doctrine by crafting a
normative theory that is logically consistent and that does not exacerbate
the disadvantages of oppressed classes. Political powerlessness could
operate as an element or factor in a new equal protection theory, but the
focus of equal protection doctrine would be the protection of persons or
groups, not the illusory policing of the political process.
Of the various alternative theories of equal protection that scholars
have discussed, the antisubordination approach offers the most promise.335
331.
See supra text accompanying notes 172–178 (discussing political science literature
analyzing power).
332.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
333.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV 1267, 1293 (2007).
334.
Eskridge, supra note 13 (arguing that the Court makes cultural judgments about the
relevance of certain personal characteristics); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of ProcessBased Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
335.
Several legal scholars, including Lawrence Tribe, Dorothy Roberts, Cass Sunstein, Reva
Siegel, and Ruth Colker have advocated antisubordination theory. See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16–21, at 1515 (2d ed. 1988); Colker, supra note 278; Dorothy E. Roberts,
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Antisubordination theorists believe that equal protection doctrine should
analyze “the concrete effects of government policy on the substantive
condition of . . . disadvantaged [classes].”336 Antisubordination theory also
conceives of the Equal Protection Clause as a legal bar against subjugation
or the formation of a caste structure. Caste results when state action
imposes or reinforces the social and economic vulnerability of classes of
persons.337 For example, laws that mandate racial segregation in public
schools do not offend the Constitution simply because they classify on the
basis of race or because they were enacted in a process tainted by
prejudice. Instead, these laws violate equal protection because they compel
persons of color to live perpetually in social and economic deprivation.
Antisubordination theory is more consistent with the original intent of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified to outlaw Black Codes—laws passed by the former
Confederate States to re-enslave blacks.338 The Civil Rights Act of 1866
was the first congressional response to the Black Codes.339 The Fourteenth
Amendment made the statute a constitutional principle.
Early interpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments by the
Supreme Court also validate antisubordination theory. The SlaughterHouse Cases, for example, found that the “pervading purpose” of the
Reconstruction Amendments was the emancipation of blacks and the end
of their oppression.340 Other cases support this theory.341 Furthermore,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1453–54 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004);
Sunstein, supra note 179; see also Hutchinson, supra note 31, at 682–98.
336.
Roberts, supra note 335, at 1454.
337.
Cass Sunstein makes this point in his groundbreaking article on the subject of caste and
equal protection:
[T]he anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices from translating highly visible and
morally irrelevant differences into systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very good
reason for society to do so. On this view, a special problem of inequality arises when
members of a group suffer from a range of disadvantages because of a group-based
characteristic that is both visible for all to see and irrelevant from a moral point of view.
This form of inequality is likely to be unusually persistent and to extend into multiple social
spheres, indeed into the interstices of everyday life.
Sunstein, supra note 179, at 2411–12.
338.
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1459, 1461 (2012).
339.
Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown,
115 YALE L.J. 256, 273 (2005).
340.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71–72 (1872).
341.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (Reconstruction Amendments give
blacks rights against discriminatory and “unfriendly” laws and from state action “implying inferiority in
civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.”); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (finding that antimiscegenation law promotes “white supremacy,”
which violates Fourteenth Amendment).
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nothing in the history of the United States since Reconstruction makes the
antisubordination principle outdated or inappropriate. Race remains a
critical determinant of maltreatment and deprivation.
Because antisubordination does not turn on any particular type of
classification being presumptively unconstitutional, this theory risks broad
judicial invalidation of state action. This outcome, however, is mitigated
because courts would only concern themselves with state action that
subjugates classes. Antisubordination theory could also operate in the
opposite direction, by validating state action that would violate the
Constitution under the current doctrine. The current doctrine, however,
probably operates too harshly with respect to remedial uses of prohibited
classifications. Also, courts need not apply minimal scrutiny of laws that
classify on the basis of race or sex—even when the intent of the law is
remedial. Instead, a court could apply intermediate scrutiny, which unlike
strict scrutiny, gives the government more flexibility to make distinctions
among social classes.342
D. Gays and Lesbians and a Reformed Equal Protection Doctrine
This Subpart concludes by applying both a refined political
powerlessness doctrine and antisubordination theory to discrimination
against gays and lesbians. Both approaches would invalidate most or all
antigay state action.
1. Gays and Lesbians and Political Powerlessness
Gays and lesbians face hurdles in equal protection cases because Court
doctrine is vague, narrow, and applied inconsistently. The refined analysis
outlined in this Article could prove successful for gay and lesbian plaintiffs
in ideologically receptive courts.
Although gays and lesbians have achieved recent political success, they
have traveled a great distance to get to this point. The first organizations for
gays and lesbians emerged in the United States after World War II.343
Although these groups were primarily social, their members also pressed
for civil rights.344 Lesbians who were discharged from the military during
the 1950s also sought assistance from existing civil rights organizations,

342.
Brennan and Marshall advocated intermediate scrutiny of race-based affirmative action. See
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 535–36 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 358–59 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (advocating intermediate scrutiny).
343.
See supra text accompanying notes 113–114.
344.
See supra text accompanying notes 113–114.
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like the American Civil Liberties Union, but were unsuccessful.345 The
ACLU advised one of the women to seek medical treatment in order to
discard her “homosexual relations.”346
Gays and lesbians became more politicized in the 1960s, following the
lead of the Civil Rights Movement and feminism.347 But it would take
decades for them to achieve measurable success. Today, most states still
permit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by private and
governmental actors.348 Federal civil rights legislation does not protect gays
and lesbians from discrimination in employment, places of public
accommodation, or in programs financed by federal subsidies.349
Furthermore, many of the gains made by gays and lesbians have faced
stiff resistance. Gay and lesbian civil rights legislation and judicial rulings
have been negated by the initiative process in many states.350 Also, voters
have removed judges from office for ruling that state constitutional law
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, including with respect to
marriage equality.351
Gays and lesbians lack significant representation in Congress and state
legislatures.352 They are not a majority demographic of the national
population or within any state. Several studies show that sexual orientation
negatively impacts the economic status of gays, lesbians, and (especially)

345.
Allan Bérubé & John D’Emilio, The Military and Lesbians During the McCarthy Years, 9
SIGNS 759 (1984).
346.
Id. at 774–75. At the time, “homosexuality” was considered a mental illness. This
classification lasted until the early 1970s. See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 471, 485 (2008) (observing that the American Psychiatric Association and American
Psychological Association withdrew this classification in 1973 and 1975, respectively).
347.
See supra text accompanying notes 114–119.
348.
See State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, June
21, 2013, available at www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_discrimination_6_
13_color.pdf.
349.
The Employment Nondiscrimination Act would prevent employers from discriminating on
the basis of a person’s “actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.” H.R.1397, 112th
Congress (1st Sess. 2011). This bill has been proposed many times; Congress has never passed it. See
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues/nondiscrimination/ENDA_main_page (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
350.
Schacter, supra note 12, at 1395 (“[T]he use of ballot measures to reverse or preempt gay
rights legislation has been a mainstay not only in the same-sex marriage debate, but in the larger debate
about gay rights over the last several decades.”).
351.
A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?_r=0.
352.
Jeremy W. Peters, Openly Gay, and Openly Welcomed in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 25,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/us/politics/gay-lawmakers-growing-presence-suggestsshift-in-attitudes.html, (reporting that the 113th Congress has six openly gay, lesbian or bisexual
members); Denis Dison, Victory Fund Celebrates Huge Night for Gay Candidates, VICTORY FUND AND
INST.: GAY POL. BLOG (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.gaypolitics.com/2012/11/07/victory-fund-celebrateshuge-night-for-gay-candidates/ (reporting 123 gay and lesbian candidates elected to state and federal
offices, which translates to about 2 per state).
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transgender
persons.353
Furthermore,
LGBT
teenagers
are
disproportionately represented among homeless youth and in cases of
suicide.354
Gays and lesbians who live in rural locations often lack the services
and political representation of gays and lesbians in urban settings.355 And
the needs of the poor and persons of color usually receive only scant or
purely symbolic attention in the most influential gay and lesbian social
movement organizations.356
Gays and lesbians remain susceptible to private and governmental
violence and discrimination by private and state actors. Overturning
antigay legislation still requires tremendous financial resources and time.
To the extent that gays and lesbians have political power, they can only use
this power to persuade courts and legislatures to recognize basic rights that
others take for granted. Legislative and judicial success for gays and
lesbians are not spoils of war won by a politically powerful class. Instead,
they are merely kernels of dignity accomplished by decades of political
struggle. These accomplishments remain subject to repeal by a majoritarian
political process that remains heteronormative. Viewed in this complex
fashion, gays and lesbians can make a strong case that they meet the
requirement of political powerlessness in the suspect class doctrine.
2. Gays and Lesbians and Antisubordination Theory
Gay and lesbian plaintiffs could also advance successful equal
protection claims using antisubordination theory. Some of the factors that
make gays and lesbians politically powerless also make them susceptible to
subjugation by state actors.
The denial of economic benefits to gays and lesbians helps to
perpetuate their economic inequality. Judicial practices that favor
biological parents instead of constructive parents stigmatize and disrupt gay
and lesbian families.357 Discriminatory prison policies cause severe
violence against gay and lesbian inmates.358 School officials who fail to
address homophobic bullying cause many gay and lesbian children to drop
out of school or to suffer from emotional distress.359 Their exclusion from
353.
See supra text accompanying notes 291–295.
354.
See supra text accompanying notes 294–298.
355.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
356.
See supra text accompanying notes 299–303.
357.
See Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples:
Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 688–90 (2005).
358.
Robinson, supra note 28.
359.
Nicolyn Harris & Maurice R. Dyson, Safe Rules or Gays’ Schools? The Dilemma of Sexual
Orientation Segregation in Public Education 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 184–85 & n.8 (2004) (“For
instance, evidence suggests that because of their sexual orientation, some LGBT students currently are
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education also renders them susceptible to poverty and related conditions,
such as homelessness. When schools prohibit gay and lesbian students and
their allies from forming support groups in public schools they exacerbate
the isolation and marginalization of gay and lesbian youth.360
Under certain circumstances, the antisubordination approach could also
require the government to act to prevent subjugation. For example, if a
state constitution guarantees every child a free public education, that
education should take place in a safe environment, which could compel
states to protect gay and lesbian students from bullies.361 Prison officials
might have an affirmative obligation to place transgender inmates in a
prison population that matches the person’s lived gender identity.362
3. Remedial Policies
Neither the refined definition of political powerlessness nor
antisubordination theory would treat remedial policies for gays and lesbians
as impermissible discrimination against heterosexuals. States and Congress
could address the acute homelessness problem among gay and lesbian
youth. State money could help fund scholarships to poor gay and lesbian
youth as a remedial measure. Congress could require recipients of federal
subsidies to make sure they do not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity. These policies are valid under
antisubordination theory because they ameliorate, rather than deepen, the
conditions of disadvantaged classes. These policies would be permissible
under a refined definition of political powerlessness because
heterosexuality alone does not lead to political vulnerability.
4. Which Theory?
Both approaches outlined in this Article—redefining political
powerlessness or replacing the suspect class doctrine with
antisubordination theory—could improve the Court’s equal protection
doctrine. Thus, this Article does not aim to announce a new totalizing
theory of equal protection.
Redefining political powerlessness, however, is closer to the current
doctrine, so it might lead to greater immediate success in litigation. The
already not receiving an educational experience comparable to heterosexual students in our nation’s
public schools.”).
360.
Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality and Antisubordination
Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 878–79 (2000).
361.
See Harris & Dyson, supra note 359, at 204–05.
362.
Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 758 (2008) (discussing violence
against incarcerated transgender women assigned by biological sex).
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antisubordination approach, however, offers a richer theory of equal
protection. It is more comprehensive than the suspect class doctrine
because it improves the analysis utilized to identify classes that warrant
judicial solicitude, but it also addresses other substantial problems
associated with the Court’s doctrine, such as the intolerance of remedial
uses of racial classifications.
Furthermore, antisubordination does not rest on the misperception that
the Court can avoid making subjective judgments when it interprets the
Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, antisubordination theories could
provide a more sustainable and honest alternative to the current doctrine
than simply reworking political powerlessness.
V. CONCLUSION
2013 was an unprecedented moment in the history of the Supreme
Court. The Court issued opinions in two important sexual orientation
discrimination cases. Although the cases gave the Court the opportunity to
cover new ground, it elected to pursue a more conservative path by
avoiding a substantive ruling on one case (opting instead to reach a holding
on procedural grounds) and applying animus review in the other. Thus, the
Court left its suspect class doctrine untouched.
As this Article has demonstrated, the suspect class doctrine suffers
from many weaknesses. And while an emerging discourse among legal
scholars and a body of case law among the courts seek to improve the
suspect class doctrine, these jurisprudential developments sometimes rest
on incorrect and strained reading of precedent. This scholarship and case
law also fail adequately to discuss the multiple factors that cause political
vulnerability among gays and lesbians. While some gays and lesbians
possess power, most of them do not. Poverty, gender, race, geography, and
disability influence the ability of gays and lesbians to exercise political
power. Accordingly, while gay and lesbian social movements might praise
the successful employment of theories posited in recent scholarship and
opinions regarding the irrelevance of political powerlessness, these theories
do not prove a comprehensive alternative to the existing doctrine.
Political science scholarship offers more sophisticated definitions of
political power that could inform legal scholarship and judicial opinions.
Furthermore, legal scholarship elaborating antisubordination theory could
ultimately replace the suspect class doctrine altogether. If legal scholars
and advocates consider these alternative approaches, they could help
fashion a new equal protection doctrine that promotes substantive justice
rather than inequality and subjugation.

